CASE DIGEST: Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol

 

STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA, petitioners, vs. RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA, respondents
G.R. No. 164774                |              April 12, 2006

 

TOPIC: Stipulation against marriage

FACTS:

Respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia and Lorna E. Estrella were all regular employees at Star Paper Corporation. During their employment in the company, Simbol and Comia, met their co-employees, Alma Dayrit and Howard Comia, and eventually married them.

Prior to their respective marriages, Jospehine Ongsitco, the Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department, advised them that should they decide to get married, one of the should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995, which states that:

1.       New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to the 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.

2.       In case of two of our employees (both singles, one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.

Simbol was compelled to resign on June 20, 1998. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.

As for Estrella, she got impregnated by one of her co-employees Luisito Zuniga, who was a married man. Upon her return to the company after recuperating from an accident, she was denied entry and was handed a memorandum stating that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum as she was on leave for 21 days and has not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation but she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her 13^th month pay.

ISSUE:

Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of a management prerogative

RULING:

The case at bar involves Article of the Labor Code 136 of the Labor Code which provides:

Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

There are 2 types of employment policies involving spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from working in the same company (anti-nepotism employment policies).

In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States, complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory. On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class.

The state courts’ rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the scope of marital status discrimination within the meaning of their respective civil rights acts. Though they agree that the term “marital status” encompasses discrimination based on a person’s status as either married, single, divorced, or widowed, they are divided on whether the term has a broader meaning.

The courts narrowly interpreting marital status to refer only to a person’s status as married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature intended a broader definition it would have either chosen different language or specified its intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married rather than to whom one is married. They construe marital status discrimination to include only whether a person is single, married, divorced, or widowed and not the “identity, occupation, and place of employment of one’s spouse.” These courts have upheld the questioned policies and ruled that they did not violate the marital status discrimination provision of their respective state statutes.

The courts that have broadly construed the term “marital status” rule that it encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one’s spouse. They strike down the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad legislative intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy violate the marital status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present employees without regard to the actual effect on the individual’s qualifications or work performance. These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the business. They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the same office. Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employee’s spouse. This is known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.

To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

The Court did not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. Petitioners’ sole contention that “the company did not just want to have 2 or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity” is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the law.

In the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If the questioned rule is upheld without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure.

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.