REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, REGION X, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
PETITIONER, VS. BENJOHN FETALVERO, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 198008
February 04, 2019
Doctrine: Power of the
OSG to deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and
offices; Question of Fact; Doctrine of Immutability; Writ of Execution
Facts:
Fetalvero owned a 2,787-square meter
parcel of land in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte.
In 1999, DPWH Region X took 569 square
meters from Fetalvero's property to be used in its flood control project.
Fetalvero stated that the project's construction on that portion of land
rendered the remaining part useless, so he demanded payment for the entire area
at P15,000.00 per square meter. However, under Presidential Administrative
Order No. 50, series of 1999, the just compensation Fetalvero was entitled to
was only P2,500.00 per square meter, or a total of P1,422,500.00, plus 10%
thereof. The rate was based on the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation
in 1999, when the property was taken. Despite negotiations, the parties failed
to agree on the amount of just compensation.
On February 13, 2008, the Republic of
the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
before the Regional Trial Court a Complaint for expropriation against
Fetalvero. It prayed "for the determination and payment of the just compensation
and the entry of a judgment of condemnation of the 569 square meters portion of
property."
Subsequently, the Office of the
Solicitor General sent a letter dated April 10, 2008 to Atty. Earnest
Anthony L. Lorea (Atty. Lorea), the Legal Staff Chief of DPWH Region X,
deputizing Atty. Lorea to assist it in the case, his authority was
"subject to the reservation contained in the Notice of Appearance filed by
the Solicitor General."
On April 16, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed before the trial court a Notice of Appearance dated April
10, 2008. It entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic and informed
the trial court that it authorized Atty. Lorea to appear on its behalf. It emphasized
that since it "retained supervision and control of the representation in
the case and had to approve withdrawal of the case, non-appeal, or other
actions which appear to compromise the interest of the Government, only notices
of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will bind the Republic."
On
September 1, 2008, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, and agreed
on the following:
1.
That the area involved is 1,428 square meters.
2.
That the price per square meter is Nine Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (PHP 9,500.00) per square meter or a total of Thirteen
Million Five Hundred Sixty[-]Six Thousand & 00/100 (PHP 13,566,000.00)
which latter is the amount to be paid in full b[y] the plaintiff to the
defendant not later than September, 2009.
3.
After September, 2009, it will earn interest at 12%
per annum until fully paid.
4.
Expenses for documentation and transfer to the
account of Plaintiff.
Fetalvero
filed before the trial court a motion to approve the Compromise Agreement and for
the issuance of judgment. On October
17, 2008, the trial court approved the Compromise Agreement. On November 6,
2008, the Republic received a copy of the Order.
Jaime A.
Pacanan, Assistant Secretary and Central Right of Way Committee Chair of the Department
of Public Works and Highways, Manila, requested advice from the Office of the
Solicitor General regarding the Compromise Agreement's legality.
The Office of the Solicitor General replied that
the government cannot be bound by the Compromise Agreement since it was not
submitted to its office for review, which is a condition under the deputation
letter and the Notice of Appearance. Thus, it was improper for the Department
of Public Works and Highways to directly submit the Compromise Agreement to the
trial court for judgment. Further, the Compromise Agreement failed to state how
it arrived at the just compensation of P9,500.00 per square meter.
Meanwhile,
Fetalvero filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Order for a Writ of Garnishment
for the satisfaction of the trial court's Order. He alleged that Sheriff
Sandor B. Bantuas served a Writ of Execution to Atty. Lorea on June 2, 2009 and
June 24, 2009. Both times, the latter ignored it and refused to comply with and
satisfy the trial court's judgment.
The Republic opposed the Motion, arguing that
since the Compromise Agreement was not legally binding, "it cannot be the
subject of a valid writ of execution or garnishment." Moreover, the
government still owns its funds and properties that were in official
depositaries; thus, these cannot be garnished or levied.
In its September 22, 2009 Order, the trial
court granted Fetalvero's Motion.
Issue(s):
1. whether or not the Compromise Agreement is void for not
having being submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General for review
2. whether or not the Compromise Agreement is void since the
amount of just compensation is allegedly grossly disadvantageous to the
government
3. whether or not government funds may be seized under a writ of
execution or a writ of garnishment in satisfaction of court judgments
Ruling:
1.
Petitioner's contentions are
partly meritorious.
The power of the OSG to deputize legal officers of government
departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist it in representing the
government is well settled. The Administrative Code of 1987 explicitly states
that the OSG shall have the power to "deputize legal officers of
government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor
General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their
respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control
over such legal officers with respect to such cases." But it is likewise
settled that the OSG's deputized counsel is "no more than the 'surrogate'
of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding" and the latter
remains the principal counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all court
orders, notices, and decisions. . . . The appearance of the deputized counsel
did not divest the OSG of control over the case and did not make the deputized
special attorney the counsel of record.
[The] reservation to "approve the withdrawal of the
case, the non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the interest
of the government" was meant to protect the interest of the
government in case the deputized . . . counsel acted in any
manner prejudicial to government.
Nonetheless, despite
the lack of the Solicitor General's approval, this Court holds that the
government is still bound by the Compromise Agreement due to laches.
The Solicitor General is assumed to have known
of the Compromise Agreement since, as principal counsel, she was furnished a
copy of the trial court's June 27, 2008 Order, which referred the case to
mediation. Even if she did not know that Atty. Lorea signed a Compromise
Agreement, she was later informed of it through the copy of the trial court's
October 17, 2008 Order, which approved the Compromise Agreement. The Solicitor
General received the October 17, 2008 Order on November 6, 2008; yet, she filed
no appeal or motion to contest the Order or the Compromise Agreement's
validity.
The underlying justification for compelling service of
pleadings, orders, notices and decisions on the OSG as principal counsel is one
and the same. As the lawyer for the government or the government corporation
involved, the OSG is entitled to the service of said pleadings and decisions,
whether the case is before the courts or before a quasi-judicial agency such as
respondent commission. Needless to say, a uniform rule for all cases handled by
the OSG simplifies procedure, prevents confusion and thus facilitates the
orderly administration of justice.
In addition, petitioner only resorted to a petition for certiorari when
it failed to appeal the case within the reglementary period.
It is elementary in remedial law that the use of an erroneous mode of
appeal is cause for dismissal of the petition for certiorari and
it has been repeatedly stressed that a petition for certiorari is
not a substitute for a lost appeal. This is due to the nature of a Rule 65
petition for certiorari which lies only where there is "no
appeal," and "no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law."
2.
Petitioner's second claim is
a question of fact improper in a petition for review under Rule 45. A Rule
45 petition pertains to questions of law and not to factual issues.
As distinguished from a question of law — which exists
"when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts" — "there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or
when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the
whole and the probabilities of the situation."
A judgment on compromise agreement is a judgment on the
merits. It has the effect of res judicata, and is immediately
final and executory unless set aside because of falsity or vices of consent.
The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions
that have already attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is
to correct errors of fact or law.
3. NO. Government
funds may not be seized under a writ of execution or a writ of garnishment in
satisfaction of court judgments
The general rule is that government funds cannot be seized by
virtue of writs of execution or garnishment. Simply put, "no money can be
taken out of the treasury without an appropriation.
Petitioner admitted in its Memorandum "the approval of
allocation for payment of road right of way projects within Region 10 under
SAA-SR 2009-001538. Since there is an existing appropriation for the
payment of just compensation, and this Court already settled that petitioner is
bound by the Compromise Agreement, respondent is legally entitled to his money
claim. However, he still has to go through the appropriate procedure for making
a claim against the Government.
The money claim against the Republic should have been first
brought before the Commission on Audit.
The Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus'
Notice of Execution violate this Court's Administrative Circular No. 10-2000
and Commission on Audit Circular No. 2001-002, which govern the issuance of
writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government.
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 dated
October 25, 2000 orders all judges of lower courts to observe utmost caution,
prudence, and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy
money judgments against government agencies.
Chapter 4, Section 11 of Executive Order No. 292 gives the
Commission on Audit the power and mandate to settle all government accounts.
Thus, the finding that government is liable in a suit to which it consented
does not translate to enforcement of the judgment by execution.
As a rule, public funds may not be disbursed absent
an appropriation of law or other specific statutory authority. Commonwealth Act
No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445, requires that all money
claims against government must first be filed before the Commission on Audit,
which, in turn, must act upon them within 60 days.
Only when the Commission on Audit rejects the
claim can the claimant elevate the matter to this Court on certiorari and, in
effect, sue the state.
Here, respondent failed to show that he first raised his
claim before the Commission on Audit. Without this necessary procedural step,
respondent's money claim cannot be entertained by the courts through a writ of
execution.
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