RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
ART. III, SEC. 14(1), 1987 CONSTITUTION No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
|
Art. III, Sec. 1 -
Deals with due process in general -
Covers both substantive and procedural aspects -
Applies to all kinds of proceedings |
Art. III, Sec. 14(1) -
Restricted to criminal cases only -
Purely to procedural requirements |
·
Criminal due process requires that the accused
be tried by an impartial and competent court in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law and with proper observance of all the rights accorded him
under the Constitution and the applicable statutes.
·
While the right to preliminary investigation is
not among the rights granted to the accused in the Bill of Rights, denial of
this right, in the absence of a valid waiver will violate due process. However,
when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to
preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that
surrounds it.
·
The basic ingredient of criminal due process is
a trial conducted in accordance with the rudiments of fair play.
·
A mistrial may be declared if it is shown that
the proceedings were held under such circumstances as would prevent the accused
from freely making his defense or the judge from freely arriving at his
decision.
·
Due process is also denied where a person is
impleaded for violation of a law, administrative regulation or municipal
ordinance not previously published as he would not know what acts he must do or
avoid to prevent prosecution.
·
Where appeal is permitted by the Constitution or
by statute, denial thereof will also militate against due process.
SELF-INCRIMINATION
ART. III, SEC. 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
·
The right against self-incrimination has its roots in the common law and is based on humanitarian and practical considerations. Humanitarian because it is intended to prevent the State, with all
its coercive powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that may
convict him. Practical because a
person subjected to such compulsion is likely to perjure himself for his own
protection.
·
The right is available not only in criminal
prosecutions but also in all other governmental proceedings, including civil
actions and administrative or legislative investigations.
·
It may be claimed not only by the person accused
of an offense but by any witness to whom an incriminating question is
addressed.
(1)SCOPE
·
GR:
As long as the question will tend to incriminate, the witness is entitled to
the privilege.
XPN:
o
He may not refuse to answer provided the
question is relevant and otherwise allowed even if the answer may tend to
embarrass him or subject him to civil liability.
o
The right may not be invoked where the question
asked relates to a past criminality for which the witness can no longer be
prosecuted.
o
He may also not refuse to answer where he has
been previously granted immunity under a validly enacted statute.
·
The kernel of the right is against not all
compulsion but testimonial compulsion only.
·
The prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material (Holt v. US)
·
The prohibition applies to the compulsion for
the production of documents, papers and chattels that may be used as evidence
against the witness, except where the State has a right to inspect the same.
·
The privilege also protects the accused against
any attempt to compel him to furnish a specimen of his handwriting in
connection with his prosecution for falsification.
(2) WHEN AVAILABLE
·
For
witnesses: the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked only
when and as the incriminating question is asked, since the witness has no way
of knowing in advance that the nature or effect of the question to be put to
him.
·
For the
accused: he can refuse at the outset and altogether to take the stand as a
witness for the prosecution, on the reasonable assumption that the purpose of
his interrogation will be to incriminate him.
(3) WAIVER
·
The right against self-incrimination may be
waived, either directly or by a failure to invoke it, provided the waiver is
uncertain and unequivocal and intelligently, understandingly and willingly
made.
·
When a person fails to invoke this right at the appropriate time he is deemed to
have waived the same.
CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION ART. III, SEC. 12, 1987 CONSTITUTION (1)
Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel. (2)
No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3)
Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him. (4)
The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
·
DEFINITION:
any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
·
begins when there is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a
particular person as a suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the
police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit
incriminating statements
·
presupposes that he is suspected of having
committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or
a confession from him
·
this right may not be invoked in situations
where the statements are spontaneously made
·
The right to counsel applies in certain
pre-trial proceedings that can be deemed ‘critical stages’ in the criminal
process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody
interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary
investigation will be subjected to no less than the State’s processes,
oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable
for criminal prosecution. (People v.
Sunga)
·
The evidentiary value of an inventory receipt
signed by the accused upon his arrest without the assistance of counsel would
be irrelevant if there exist other ample evidence to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (People v. Mariano)
·
The right to counsel may not be invoked by
resource persons in the public hearings conducted by the Congress (Philcomsat Holdings Corp. v. Senate)
·
There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which
mandates that an employee should be assisted by counsel in an administrative
case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of
counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings. (Perez v. People)
·
While roadside questioning of a motorist
detained in pursuant to a routine stop has not been considered as a custodial
investigation or even a formal arrest, nevertheless, if a motorist who has been
detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that
renders him in custody for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full
panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.
·
Limited only to criminal investigations and does
not cover administrative investigations
·
An amicable settlement, executed before NBI
agents, with the assistance of counsel, presumed to be competent and
independent, is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial
confession or admission but is a contract between the parties within the
parameters of their mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. (Aquino v. Paiste)
·
Mere uncounseled statement made during a
custodial investigation of the NBI, without any proof that the same was used as
prosecution evidence, cannot serve to invalidate the trial. (Eugenio v. People)
·
Custodial investigation shall include the
practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law. (R.A. 7438)
·
Requisites
for an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible:
(1)
Voluntary
(2)
With assistance of counsel
(3)
In writing
(4)
Express
·
As mandated, it is not enough that the police
investigator merely inform him of his constitutional right to silence and to counsel,
and then taking statements down, the interrogating officer must have patience
in explaining this rights to him. (People
v. Ramos)
·
Uncounselled extrajudicial statements given to
barangay tanods and barangay chairmen have likewise been considered as inadmissible,
but uncounseled admissions to neighbors and barangay kagawads which were not
made during custodial investigations have been admitted in evidence against the
accused who made them.
·
Any allegation of violation of rights during
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused become the
basis of their conviction. (People v.
Buluran)
·
If confessions written in advance by the police
for persons of limited intelligence or educational attainment have been
outlawed, the same disapprobation applies where a confession was signed by a
person whose sanity was dubious, where the intelligence was not only limited
but impaired. (People v. Capitin)
·
Swearing officers should have the confessant
physically examined by independent doctors before administering oath, to
discourage attempts to secure confession through violence. (People v. Barros)
·
Claims of torture are easily concocted, and
cannot be given credence unless substantiated by competent and independent
corroborating evidence, like medical certificates. (People v. Muit)
·
Where the defendant did not present evidence of
compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was
presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been
voluntarily executed. (People v. Del
Rosario)
·
One of the indicia of voluntariness in the
execution of petitioner’s extrajudicial statement is that it contains many
details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known and
could not have supplied without the knowledge and information given by him. (People v. Muit)
·
The new Section 12 stresses the right of the
person under investigation to “competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice” to be provided
free if he cannot afford counsel de parte.
·
Rights guaranteed in Subsection 1 may be waived
by the suspect so long as he does this in writing and in the presence of
counsel, who has presumably advised him. This advice may include the waiver of
the counsel’s services.
·
After the start of custodial investigation, any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible.
(People v. Macam)
·
Without stating reasons, the SC overturned the
doctrine in People v. Macam and in De la Torre v. CA, it reiterated the
rule in the Gamboa Case that the
right to counsel is not available during a police lineup as this is not considered
part of the custodial investigation.
·
The reason offered in People v. Lara is that “during a police line-up, the process has
not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the
witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the
course of the line-up.”
·
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the
police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is
brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is don thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is
also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose. (People
v. Algarme)
·
Totality
of circumstances test
-
Adopted by the courts in resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects
-
Factors:
(1)
The witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at
the time of the crime;
(2)
The witness’ degree of attention at that time;
(3)
The accuracy of any prior description, given by
the witness;
(4)
The level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification;
(5)
The length of time between the crime and the
identification;
(6)
The suggestiveness of the identification
procedure
·
The operative act is when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the
police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminatory statements. (People v.
Compil)
·
The Constitution requires not just any kind of
counsel but effective and vigilant counsel.
·
An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily
and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist
his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. (People v. Tomaquin)
·
Infraction of the rights of an accused during
custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible
only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such investigation. (People v. Malimit)
·
The admissibility of other evidence, provided
they are relevant to the issue is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is
not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation. (Ho Wai Pang v. People)
·
A re-enactment of the crime in the absence of
counsel is inadmissible evidence against the accused. (People v. Suarez)
·
Waiver of the suspect’s custodial rights without
the assistance of counsel is invalid.
·
But the right to counsel is not unlimited. Where
the accused repeatedly asked for postponement of his trial on the ground that
he was still looking for a lawyer de parte, the court should then appoint a
counsel de oficio for him.
·
An extrajudicial confession obtained without the
assistance of counsel but later affirmed by the accused in open court during
his trial has been considered admissible against him. (People v. Concepcion)
·
A duly executed extrajudicial confession is
admissible against the confessant. It may, in fact, be admissible as
corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his
co-accused. (People v. Reyes)
·
But an extrajudicial confession which is
inadmissible against an accused because of a violation of his right to be
informed or hos right to counsel would likewise be inadmissible against his
co-accused. (People v. Bokingo)
·
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or
admission of one accused is admissible only against said accused, but is
inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter
repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, during the trial and the other
accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the
admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed
into a judicial admission. (Yapyuco v.
Sandiganbayan)
Bail
RULE 114, SEC. 17(C), RULES OF COURT Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court
may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality
where he is held.
ART. III, SEC. 13, 1987 CONSTITUTION All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
-
DEFINITION:
The security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished
by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as may
be required
-
PURPOSE:
to secure provisional release
-
Only persons under detention may petition for
bail
-
Bail cannot be denied simply because the person
detained has not yet been formally charged in court but is still under
investigation for the commission of an offense
-
EXCEPTION:
any offense which under the law existing at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail may be punished by reclusion perpetua, or
death, even if a lesser penalty may be imposed upon conviction owing to the
mitigating circumstances that may be disclosed later
-
XPN TO
THE XPN: Even if the crime imputed to the accused is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, he is still entitled to bail if the evidence of guilt is not
strong
·
A finding by the Court after a bail hearing that
the evidence of guilt is not strong would not have any effect on the prior
determination of probable cause because the standard of strong evidence of
guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than
the standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a
criminal case. (Leviste v. Almeda)
·
A hearing on bail is separate and distinct from
the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the
trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime. (Directo v.
Bautista)
·
Where the accused is convicted of a capital
offense or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, his bail shall be
canceled and he shall be placed in confinement pending the resolution of his
appeal. (People v. Cortez)
·
It has likewise been ruled that a court may not
release on bail an accused who has confessed to the crime. (Valerio v. CA)
·
Hearing on the petition for bail is required to
satisfy due process, but this may be summary in nature or held in the course of
the trial itself. A separate hearing is not indispensable. (Gerardo v. CFI)
·
Bail may not be granted upon mere ex parte
motion, particularly not on the same day that it is filed with the court. (Villanueva v. Buaya)
·
Reliance on a previous order granting bail does
not justify the absence of a hearing in a subsequent petition for bail. (Baylon v. Sison)
·
The fact that the public prosecutor may
recommend bail for the accused would not warrant dispensing with the hearing.
The public prosecutor’s recommendation of bail is not material in deciding
whether or to conduct the mandatory hearing or not. For one, the public
prosecutor’s recommendation, albeit persuasive, does not necessarily bind the
trial judge, in whom alone the discretion to determine whether to grant bail or
not is vested.
·
Duties of
a judge once an application for bail is file:
(1)
In all cases whether bail is a matter of right
or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail
or require him to submit his recommendation
(2)
Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion
(3)
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is
strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution
(4)
If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond
·
It has been held that the mere probability of
escape does not warrant denial of the right to bail; the remedy is to increase
the bail, provided it is not excessive. But after conviction in the regional
trial court, the accused may be denied bail if there is risk of his absconding.
(Zafra v. City Warden)
·
The Supreme Court has also granted bail even
when evidence of guilt of the prescribed offense was strong, in view of the
illness of the accused which required his hospitalization. (De la Rama v. People’s Court)
·
Guidelines
to be observed to prevent violation of the prohibition against excessive bail:
RULE 114,
SEC. 9, RULES OF COURT Amount of bail; guidelines. —
The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a
reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the
following factors: (a)
Financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) Nature
and circumstances of the offense; (c) Penalty
for the offense charged; (d)
Character and reputation of the accused; (e) Age and
health of the accused; (f) Weight
of the evidence against the accused; (g)
Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h)
Forfeiture of other bail; (i) The fact
that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) Pendency
of other cases where the accused is on bail. Excessive bail shall not be required.
RULE 114, SEC. 5, RULES OF COURT Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite
the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the
original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with
and resolved by the appellate court. Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed
to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under
the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of
the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist,
quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously
escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the
offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of
his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk
that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion
of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after
notice to the adverse party in either case.
·
It has been further been ruled that” after one
is convicted by the trial court, the presumption of innocence, and with it, the
constitutional right to bail, ends. (Leviste
v. CA)
·
Bail is not intended as a punishment nor as in
satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of
of the appellate court. (Yap v. CA)
RULE 114,
SEC. 26, RULES OF COURT Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack
of or irregular preliminary investigation. — An application for or
admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity
of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them
before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as
practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
·
The principle that the accused is precluded from
questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he
voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto. (Borlongan
v. Pena)
·
The power to order the release or transfer of a
person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in the
provincial government, much less the governor. (Ambil v. Sandiganbayan)
Presumption of
Innocence
ART. III, SEC. 14(2), 1987 CONSTITUTION In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
·
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
·
It is the responsibility of the prosecution to
establish the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; otherwise he is
entitled to acquittal. Conviction will depend not on the weakness of his
defense but on the strength of the prosecution.
·
The person accused of an offense is confronted
by the full panoply of State authority; in a manner of speaking, he goes to bat
with all the bases loaded. It is important therefore, in the interest of
justice, to even up the odds, as it were, by guaranteeing him certain rights
during his trial. Chief among these is the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
·
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must
never sway judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be
acquitted even though their innocence may not have been established. The
Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been
the policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored,
and exoneration granted as a matter of right. (Fernandez v. People)
·
Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of
innocence may be overcome by contrary presumptions based on the experience of
human conduct.
Ex.:
o
Escape from detention during the pendency of the
case before the trial court is in itself an indication of his guilt. But
non-flight may not, on its own, stand as proof of innocence.
o
Failure on the part of the accused to explain
his possession of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable presumption
that it was he himself who had stolen it.
o
Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi, and would be sufficient to
convict unless the accused is able to present a satisfactory explanation of his
possession of the same. (People v. Lucio)
o
Under the RPC, the inability of an accountable
officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him will be considered prima
facie evidence that he has appropriated them to his personal uses.
o
The presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions cannot by itself affect the constitutional presumption of
innocence enjoyed by an accused, particularly when the prosecution’s evidence
is weak. The evidence of the prosecution must be strong enough to pierce the
shield of this presumptive innocence and to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient
to overcome this presumption, necessarily the judgment of conviction of the
trial must be set aside. The onus probandi on the prosecution is not discharged
by casting doubts upon the innocence of an accused, but by eliminating all
reasonable doubts as to his guilt. (People
v. Mirantes)
o
It is incumbent on the accused, who had admitted
the killing, to establish his case of self-defense instead of relying merely on
the weakness of the prosecution. (People
v. Regulacion)
o
Failure or refusal of the accused to testify may
prejudice him if the prosecution has already established a prima facie case
against him. (People v. Resano)
·
The duty to apprise the accused of the right to
remain silent rests not with the court but with the defense counsel. (People v. Tampus)
·
The constitutional mandate of presumption of
innocence prevails until a promulgation of final conviction is made. (Trillanes v. Pimentel)
Right to be Heard
·
Includes the right to present evidence in one’s
defense, as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at
every stage of the proceedings
(1) Assistance of Counsel
·
The right to counsel now begins from the time a
person is taken into custody and placed under investigation for the commission
of a crime. Manifestly, this right becomes all important when he is already on
trial and confronted by a skilled and experienced prosecutor.
·
The right of the accused to counsel in criminal
proceedings has never been considered subject to waiver. (Flores v. Ruiz)
·
Rationale
for this right: The intricacies of courtroom procedure are not within the
knowledge of the ordinary layman, let alone one who is ignorant and unlettered.
·
In criminal cases, the right of an accused
person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable; otherwise, there
would be a grave denial of due process.
·
Counsel de oficio should not merely make the
motions of defending the accused but exert his utmost efforts as if he were
representing a paying client.
·
It should be noted, however, that the right to
be silent and to the assistance of counsel may be waived during a custodial
investigation under Article III, Sec.
12(1).
·
The right to counsel does not cease after trial,
but continue even where the case is appealed.
·
While constitutional rights may be waived, such
waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish
the right.
·
The right to counsel is not absolute. If an
accused repeatedly asks for the postponement of his trial on the ground that he
is still looking for counsel de parte, the court would be justified in
appointing for him a counsel de oficio.
·
Where it is shown that an accused, out on bail
while his appeal is pending, had every opportunity to contact his counsel of
record or procure the services of new counsel for purposes of properly pursuing
said appeal, he shall be considered as having lost this remedy for failure to
comply with the orders of the Court of Appeals requiring him to file his
appellant’s brief.
·
Negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding
on the client.
Nature and Cause if
Accusation
·
The defendant is entitled to know the nature and
cause of the accusation against him so he can adequately prepare for his
defense.
·
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense
that is not clearly charged in the complaint of information. To convict him of
an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be
violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if
duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him. (Patula v.
People)
·
Three-fold
Purpose:
1.
To furnish the accused with such a description
of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;
2.
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal
for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;
3.
To inform the court of the facts alleged, so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction.
RULE 110,
SEC. 8, RULES OF COURT Designation of the offense. —The
complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
RULE 110,
SEC. 9, RULES OF COURT Cause of the accusation.
— The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute
but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
·
A
complaint or information is sufficient if:
o
It states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute;
o
the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense;
o
the name of the offended party;
o
the approximate date of commission of the
offense; and
o
the place where the offense was committed.
·
Test of
sufficiency of an Information – whether it enables a person of common
understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly
·
Purpose:
to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises
during trial
·
The description and not the designation of the
offense is controlling. Hence, even if there be an erroneous designation, the
accused may be validly convicted of the crime described in the information.
·
Although it is imperative in criminal
prosecutions to provide for the designation in the Information of the specific
statute violated so as to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly, the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information, or
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in
the complaint or information.
·
A mere change in the date of the commission of the
crime, if the disparity of time is not great, is more formal than substantial.
Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused since the
propose amendment would not alter the nature of the offense. (Kummer v. People)
RULE 110,
SEC. 14, RULES OF COURT Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused. However, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused
from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. If it appears at any time before judgment that
a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119,
provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
·
The test as to when the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense
under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be
available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. On the
other hand, an amendment which merely state with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore,
adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to
form that can be made at anytime. (Albert
v. Sandiganbayan)
·
A practical consequence of the non-allegation of
a detail that aggrevates his liability is to prohibit the introduction or
consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that
detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate
analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
information and that proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in
the offense proved. In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter, the offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense
proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter. (People v.
Valdez)
·
Aggravating/qualifying
circumstances will not add any essential element to the crime. Neither will
the use of such words further apprise the accused of the nature of the charge.
The specific allegation of the attendant circumstance in the Information,
couple with the designation of the offense and a statement of the acts
constituting the offense as required in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, is
sufficient to warn the accused. (People
v. de la Cruz)
·
Void-for-vagueness
Rule – the defendant is also denied the right to be informed of the charge
against him, and to due process as well, where the statute itself is couched in
such indefinite language that is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence
to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and, hence, should
be avoided
·
The test in determining whether a criminal
statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding
and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the “vagueness” doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld –
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, ad petitioner seem to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity is permissible as long
as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not
be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings, or detailed in its provision. Especially where, because of the nature
of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details as in all other
statutes. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan)
·
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the
accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the
accusations against him.
·
The importance of arraignment is based on the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed
·
Procedural due process requires that the accused
be arraigned so that he may be informed of the reason for his indictment, the
specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could
be possibly meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused, for the
first time, is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts
him.
·
The right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against an accused cannot be waived for reasons of public
policy.
·
Even if the accused were to enter a plea of
guilty, the judge would still be bound to exercise extra care in informing the
accused of his rights and the consequences of his plea guilty and in
ascertaining the presence of the different circumstances to be taken into
account in the imposition of the proper penalty.
·
3
conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident plea of
guilty by the accused:
(1)
It must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his
plea;
(2)
It must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove his guilt of the accused and the precise degree of
culpability; and
(3)
It must ask the accused whether he desires to
present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires.
·
The right to question the sufficiency of an
Information is not absolute. An accused is deemed to have waived this right if
he fails to object upon his arraignment or during his trial.
The Trial
·
This requirement will call for no less than “the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge,” to insure that justice is done to the
defendant.
·
It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot
be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a
judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just. (Mateo v. Villaluz)
·
In any event, convictions are based not on the
mere appearance of the accused but on his actual commission of crime, to be
ascertained with the pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law
for all without favor or malice and always with justice. (People v. Opida)
·
Publicity of the trial is necessary to prevent
abuses that may be committed by the court to the prejudice of the defendant.
The people have a right to attend the proceedings not only because of their
interest therein but also so they can see whether or not the constitutional
safeguards for the benefit of the accused are being observed. The accused is
also entitled to the company of his relatives and friends to give him the moral
support he needs during his ordeal.
·
This rule is not absolute, however, for it is
competent for the court to bar the public in certain cases, like rape trials,
where the purpose of the spectators in attending the proceedings might be only
to pander their morbid curiosity, more so since their presence is likely to
inhibit testimony and embarrass some of the parties.
·
Representatives of the press have no special
standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them to
attend a trial, since within the courtroom a reporter’s constitutional rights
are no greater than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion
of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can also alter or
destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the
requirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant
and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet
of reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom. (Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the
Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino’s Libel Case)
·
An accused has a right to a public trial but it
is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that
he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights
are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be
open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves
with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public
to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible
and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed
during the proceedings. (Perez v.
Estrada)
·
Speedy
trial
Definition:
one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays
Purpose:
Intended to relieve the accused of needless anxieties and inconveniences before
sentence is pronounced upon him
·
Inordinate delay in resolving a criminal
complaint, being violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process and to the speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the
criminal case. (Angchonco, Jr. v.
Ombudsman)
·
The Court has consistently maintained that
although a speedy determination of an action implies a speedy trial, speed is
not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for
the administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties
and the requirements of procedural due process and an adherence to the Court’s
standing admonition that the discretion granted judges in the granting or
denial of motions for postponement and the setting aside or denial of orders
previously issued “should always be predicated on the consideration that more
than the mere convenience of the courts or the parties in the case, the ends of
justice and fairness would be served thereby” are more important than a race to
end the trial. (Amberti v. CA)
·
The right to a speedy trial, which begins from
the filing of the information, cannot be quantified into a specified number of
days or months but must be examined in the light of surrounding circumstances
such as the unavailability of witnesses. (Martin
v. Ver)
·
Factors
to be considered in ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of
cases have been violated (Tilendo v.
Ombudsman):
(1)
The length of the delay;
(2)
The reasons for the delay;
(3)
The assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused; and
(4)
The prejudice caused by the delay
SEC. 1(G), RULE 116, RULES OF COURT Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or
Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of
particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall
be excluded in computing the period.
SEC. 7 OF RA 8493 “THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
OF 1998” Time Limit
Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and
Trial. – The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has
appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending,
whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is
entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for
trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as
fixed by the court. If the accused
pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she
interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall
require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and
require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.
·
Although the trial is an indispensable and,
indeed, the most important part of the proceedings against the accused, it has
been held that the right to be present thereat is a personal right and
therefore may be validly waived.
·
The presence of the accused may be required if
it is necessary for purposes of identification, that is, where the prosecution
intends to introduce witnesses who will identify him. (People v. Presiding Judge)
·
The right to be present at the trial may also be
validly waived under the new rule allowing trial in absentia.
(1) Trial in Absentia
·
Requisites:
(1)
The accused has already been arraigned;
(2)
He has been duly notified of the trial; and
(3)
His failure to appear is unjustified
·
Purpose:
to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past
be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the
defendant’s escape
·
Trial in absentia does not, however, abrogate
the provisions of the Rules of Court regarding forfeiture of the bail bond if
the accused fails to appear at his trial.
The Right of
Confrontation
·
Twofold
purpose:
(1)
To afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of the witnesses by cross-examination
(2)
To allow the judge to observe the deportment of
witnesses
·
This constitutional requirement insures that the
witnesses will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the
threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,
a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it
enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his
credibility. (People v. Seneris)
·
Normally there is less propensity to lie on the
part of a witness when actually confronted by the accused than when the testimony
is given behind his back.
·
Save in the case provided in the Rules of Court,
like the dying declaration, the testimony of the witness against the accused is
subject to cross-examination by defense counsel.
·
Depositions and ex parte affidavits are inadmissible
unless the persons making them are presented in court for examination on their
statements by the judge and the accused. Evidence of this nature is hearsay and
excluded by the Rules of Court.
·
The right of confrontation may be done through
counsel; accused need not have face-to-face confrontation with their
adversaries. (Marcos v. Garchitorena)
·
It has also been held that if a prosecution
witness dies before his cross-examination can be completed, his direct
testimony cannot be stricken off the record, provided the material points of
his direct testimony had been covered on cross.
·
GR:
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in an open
court.
XPN:
the Rules of Court recognizes conditional examination of witnesses and the use
of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony
·
While the right of a party to confront and
cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or
civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with
quasi-judicial power, is a fundamental right which is part of due process, this
right, however, has always been understood as requiring not necessarily an
actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to
cross-examine if desired. What is proscribed by statutory norm and
jurisprudential precept is the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine.
·
Right to cross-examine is not without limit. The
trial court has the power to direct the course of the trial either to shorten
or to extend the direct or cross examination of counsel.
Compulsory Process
·
The accused is entitled under the Constitution
to the issuance of subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the purpose of
compelling the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence that he
may need for his defense.
·
Failure to obey the process is punishable as
contempt of court; if necessary, the witness may even be arrested so he can
give the needed evidence.
·
In exceptional circumstances, the defendant may
even ask for the conditional examination, provided the expected testimony is
material, of any witness who is “so sick or infirm as to afford reasonable
ground for believing that he will not be able to attend the trial, or resides
more than one hundred kilometers from the place of trial and has no means to
attend the same, or that, apart from the foregoing, other similar circumstance
exist that would make him unavailable or prevent him from attending the trial.”
·
He is also entitled to employ the various
methods of discovery allowed under the Rules of Court.
·
This right was not, along with the right to
cross-examine, considered as applicable to a proceeding before the Court of Tax
Appeals, even if the subject of the proceedings before said court was related
to a pending preliminary investigation.
·
Right to compulsory process must be invoked
during the trial. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver that cannot be
rectified or undone on appeal.
Prohibited
Punishments
ART. III, SEC. 19, 1987 CONSTITUTION (1)
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless,
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua. (2)
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against
any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
·
The old prohibition against “cruel or unusual
punishment” has been rewritten to cover “cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment” to make the provision more comprehensive in line with the emphasis
on the protection of human rights in Article XIII of the Constitution.
·
Mere fines and imprisonment are not violative of
the above sections. To be so, the penalty must be inhuman and barbarous and
shocking to the conscience. Cruelty must be inherent in the penalty.
·
Torture is a cruel punishment because it
involves a deliberate design to increase the suffering of the prisoner in a
manner so flagrant and oppressive as to revolt the moral sense of the
community.
·
But where an unforeseeable accident adds to the
suffering of the convict, a penalty otherwise valid does not become cruel or
unusual.
·
The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method if punishment, not
the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely. (Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice)
·
Mere severity does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. To come
under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of
the community.
·
These principles notwithstanding , it has been
held that a penalty proportionate to the offense may be imposed in some
instances without violation of the Constitution. This would be allowed, for
example, where the offense has become so rampant as to require the adoption of
a more effective deterrent.
·
The above observations are also applicable to
the prohibition against the imposition of excessive fines. It should be borne
in mind that this prohibition is addressed not only to the legislature but also
to the judge who, in the determination of the fine to be imposed, must take
into account the financial condition of the convict, to prevent the fine from
being excessive, and also discriminatory.
ART. 66, REVISED PENAL CODE Imposition
of fines. —
In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be
given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more
particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.
·
The Commission on Human Rights is especially
entrusted with the enforcement of the prohibition in Subsection 2, which, to be
really effective, must be provided with “teeth” through the enactment of a law
imposing the necessary sanctions upon those violating the rule.
Double Jeopardy
ART. III, SEC. 21, 1987 CONSTITUTION No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
·
Res judicata in prison grey
·
Prohibits the prosecution again of any person
for a crime which he has previously been acquitted or convicted
·
The object is to set the effects of the first
prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter
be subjected to the dangers and anxiety of a second charge against him for the
same offense
·
The principle of double jeopardy finds no
application in administrative cases. However, while contempt is not a criminal
offense, it partakes of the nature of a criminal action. Thus, the dismissal of
the indirect contempt charge against respondent amounts to an acquittal, which
effectively bars a second prosecution.
RULE 117, SEC. 7, RULES OF COURT Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for
any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information. However, the
conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former
complaint or information under any of the following instances: (a) the
graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act
or omission constituting the former charge; (b) the
facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only
after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or (c) the plea
of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of
Rule 116. In any of
the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in
part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of
conviction for the graver offense.
(1) Requisites
1.
A valid complaint or information;
2.
Filed before a competent court;
3.
To which the defendant had pleaded; and
4.
Of which he had been previously acquitted or
convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent
A. Complaint or Information
·
A prosecution based on an invalid complaint or
information cannot lead to a valid judgment and hence will not place the
accused under jeopardy.
·
Where the original information is defective and
the case is dismissed on motion of the accused, it may be validly renewed with
the filing or corrected information. But if, without the express consent of the
accused, the information is dismissed on the ground that it is defective when
it is not so in fact, another prosecution based on the same allegation
constitute double jeopardy.
B. Competent Court
·
A court without jurisdiction cannot render a
valid judgment; hence, a person charged before it cannot plead double jeopardy
when tried anew for the same offense by a competent court, as the first
prosecution never placed him in jeopardy.
·
Double jeopardy requires valid previous
proceedings.
·
Where a court martial and a civil court have
concurrent jurisdiction, a decision by one court will bar another prosecution
for the same offense in the other court. (Crisologo
v. People)
·
Where an information is motu propio dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction by a court which is actually competent to hear it, the
dismissal will inure to the benefit of the accused, who is entitled to plead
double jeopardy. (US v. Regala)
C. Valid Plea
·
A defendant is never placed under jeopardy until
after he shall have pleaded to the charge against him during the arraignment.
·
While under Sec.
5 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, “the grant of a motion to quash filed
by the defendant before he makes his plea can be appealed as the defendant has
not been placed in jeopardy,” under Sec.
6 of the same rule, said dismissal would not stand as a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense “unless the basis for the dismissal is the
extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy.”
D. Termination of Case
·
Judgment of conviction is appealable within 15
days but becomes final if the convict starts serving his sentence even before
the expiration of this period.
·
GR: A
dismissal with the express consent of the accused will not bar another
prosecution for the same offense, as the said consent is considered a waiver of
his right against double jeopardy.
·
Where the accused succeeds in having the case
dismissed on the ground that the information is insufficient, he cannot upon
filing of a corrected information invoke double jeopardy by claiming that the
original information was sufficient. Neither can he, upon dismissal of a case
on his motion for lack of jurisdiction, question his prosecution for the same
offense before another court, on the ground that the first court had
jurisdiction after all.
·
Dismissal, even if with the express consent of
the accused, will give rise to double jeopardy if the same is based on:
o
Insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution
o
Made on the basis of a demurrer to evidence
o
If there is a violation of the right of the
accused to a speedy trial
·
Under these grounds, the dismissal would be
tantamount to an acquittal.
1) Appeal of Prosecution
·
A judgment of acquittal is final and is no
longer reviewable.
·
A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and
a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts,
will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
·
A judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered
because it places the accused under double jeopardy.
·
The prosecution can appeal where the accused is
deemed to have waived or is estopped from invoking his right against double
jeopardy.
·
Cases where
the accused cannot invoke double jeopardy:
o
Grant of a motion to quash which is file before
the defendant makes his plea
o
Accused is acquitted without giving the
prosecution its day in court
o
Order of dismissal or acquittal made with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
o
Where the case was dismissed on the ground of
delay caused by the defendant itself
·
In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor
General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended
party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned.
·
The government cannot appeal from an acquittal
or for the purpose of increasing or modifying a penalty even if the decision be
not in accordance with law.
2) Crimes Covered
·
If the four above-stated elements of double
jeopardy are present, the accused may not be prosecuted anew for the original
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the original complaint or information.
a.) Doctrine of Supervening Event
·
The accused may be prosecuted for another
offense if a subsequent development changes the character of the first
indictment under which he may have already been charged or convicted.
RULE 117, SEC. 7, RULES OF COURT Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
— When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information. However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged
in the former complaint or information under any of the following
instances: (a) the graver offense
developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge; (b) the facts constituting the
graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered
in the former complaint or information; or (c) the plea of guilty to the
lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116. In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves
in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the
event of conviction for the graver offense.
b.) Inseparable Offenses
·
Where one offense inseparable from another and
proceeds from the same act, they cannot be the subject of separate
prosecutions.
·
However, it is possible for one act to give rise
to several crimes, in which case separate prosecutions for each crime may be
filed, provided the elements of the several crimes are not identical.
·
A plea of double jeopardy cannot be accorded
merit where two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law, however
closely they may appear to be connected in fact. Protection against double
jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offense. Where
two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same technical offense. Where two different laws
(or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. (Perez v.
CA)
Act Violating Law and
Ordinance
·
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
·
Our Bill of Rights deal with two (2) kinds of
double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, ordains that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The second sentence of said clause provides
that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction, or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same act, provided that he is charged with different
offenses, or of the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not
include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even
if the offense charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes
a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two
charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either
the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally,
such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached
under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed
of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither
conviction nor acquittal in either case. (Yap
v. Lutero)
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