CONRADO R. ESPIRITU, JR., TERESITA ESPIRITU-GUTIERREZ,
MARIETTA R. ESPIRITU-CRUZ, OSCAR R. ESPIRITU, and ALFREDO R. ESPIRITU,
petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 219070 | June 21, 2017
FACTS:
On March 1, 2010, petitioners filed for an Application for
Registration of Title to Land covering a parcel of land with an area of 6,971
sq. m., located at Brgy. La Huerta, Paranaque City.
The petitioners alleged that their deceased parents, Conrado
Espiritu, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) and Felicidad Rodriguez-Espiritu (Felicidad), were
the owners of the subject land; that they inherited the subject land after
their parents passed away; and that they, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, public, and continuous possession
of the subject land in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years.
Thereafter, trial ensued, during which Oscar, Conrado, Jr.,
Ludivina Aromin (Aromin), Ferdinand Encarnacion (Encarnacion), and Marietta
Espiritu-Cruz (Marietta), were presented as witnesses.
Encarnacion, a staff in the Docket Division of the Land
Registration Authority, testified that the notices relative to the application
for registration of the subject land were served on the owners of the adjoining
lots.
Marietta testified that she is one of the children of
Conrado, Sr. and Felicidad; that she has known the subject land since she was 7
years old because her parents owned the same; that before her parents, her
grandparents and Felicidad’s parents, Dalmacio Rodriguez and Dominga Catindig
were the owners of the subject land; that she, together with her siblings,
inherited the subject land from their parents; that they possessed the subject
land openly and continuously since the death of their parents; that the subject
land was agricultural in nature because it was being used as salt land during
summer and as fishpond during rainy season; and that there were no adverse
claimants over the subject land.
Oscar corroborated Marietta’s testimony. He reiterated that
they were in possession and occupation of the subject land because they could
visit the property whenever they wanted to, introduce improvements thereon, and
prevent intruders from entering it.
Conrado, Jr. testified that he commissioned the survey of
the subject land and that he requested and received from the director of FMS DENR
a certification stating that the subject land was part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and that they utilized the said land in
their salt-making business.
In addition to the testimonies of their witnesses, the
petitioners also presented in evidence several tax declarations covering the
subject land.
The RTC granted the application for registration. The trial
court opined that the petitioners were able to establish possession and
occupation over the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. It gave credence to the testimony of Marietta that
she had known that the subject land belonged to their parents as early as 1940
because she was already 7 years old at that time.
The trial court was convinced that the petitioners were able
to prove that the subject land was part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. In so ruling, the trial court relied on the contents of the
DENR-NCR certification.
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The
appellate court reiterated the prevailing doctrine that to successfully
register a parcel of land, the application must be accompanied by: (1) a CENRO
or PENRO certification stating the alienable and disposable character of the
land applied for; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. It opined that the DENR-NCR certification presented by the
petitioners would not suffice to prove that the subject land was indeed
classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. The CA explained
that under DAO Nos. 20 and 38, the Regional Technical Director of the FMS had
no authority to issue certificates of land classification; and that the
petitioners failed to present a certified true copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land could be registered in the
name of petitioners.
RULING:
NO.
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of
possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of
prescription.
Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based
on possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was
susceptible to private ownership at that time. Thus, for registration under
Section 14(1) to prosper, the applicant for original registration of title to
land must establish the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and (3) that the
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
The rule is that applicants for land registration bear the
burden of proving that the land applied for registration is alienable and
disposable. In this regard, the applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land
of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of
the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, he must also
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
As to the second and third requisites, the Court concurs
with the appellate court that the petitioners failed to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land on or before June 12,
1945.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Remman Enterprises, Inc., the
Court held that for purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the
claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot
just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual
evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts
of dominion over it of such nature as a party would actually exercise over his
own property.
In this case, the petitioners failed to sufficiently show that
on or before June 12, 1945, they and their predecessors-in-interest actually
exercised acts of dominion over the subject land. Their assertion that they
could visit the subject land could not be considered an act of dominion which
would vest upon them the right to own the subject land. Likewise, their general
claim that they could prevent any person from intruding thereto was
unsubstantiated by any evidence aside from their allegations.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,
the Court explained that when Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 provides that
persons “who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws,” it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a
valid basis for the registration of lands.
For registration under this provision to prosper, the
applicant must establish the following requisites: (a) the land is an alienable
and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b) the
applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land
for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30
years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been
converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning
of the said 10-yr or 30-yr period of possession.
As regards the first and most important requisite, the Court
has ruled that declaration of alienability and disposability is not enough for
the registration of land under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. There must be an
express declaration that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial property.
Here, the petitioners failed to present any competent
evidence which could show that the subject land had been declared as part of
the patrimonial property of the State. The DENR-NCR certification presented by
the petitioners only certified that the subject land was not needed for forest
purposes. This is insufficient because the law mandates that to be subjected to
acquisitive prescription, there must be a declaration by the State that the
land applied for is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth pursuant to Article 422 of the Civil Code.
Clearly, the petitioners failed to prove that they acquired the subject land
through acquisitive prescription.
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