CASE DIGEST: Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals

 


LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents
G.R. No. 118712                |              October 6, 1995

 

FACTS:

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that on Sept. 4, 1992, the TCTs of the petitioner were totally cancelled by the ROD of Leyte and were transferred in the name of farmer beneficiaries, based on the request of DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro Yap for the parcels of lands covered by the said TCTs, and issued in lieu thereof another TCTs in the name of listed beneficiaries without prior notice to Yap and without complying with the required deposit of compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank.

Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that they are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking with the beneficiaries to pay rentals to the LandBank for the use of their farm lots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12; that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago.; that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller’s Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the LandBank.

Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR) alleges that a summary proceeding to determine the compensation of the property was conducted by the DARAB on their properties in San Francisco, Quezon without notice; that a decision was rendered fixing the compensation for the 209-hectare parcel of land at P2,768,326.34 and ordered the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for the said amount in the name of AMADCOR. With respect with their property in Tabaco, Albay, AMADOR alleged that emancipation patents were issued covering 701-hectares of their 1629-hectare land, but no action was taken by DAR to fix the compensation for the said land; that a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83, 3 notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR.

Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively “earmarked,” “reserved” and “deposited in trust accounts” for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.

Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely “earmarked,” “deposited in trust” or “reserved” the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds.

Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the “Certificate of Deposit” by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).

For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words “reserved/deposited” were also used.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assailed Administrative order is valid

RULING:

Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:

 “Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands—

x x x x x x  x x x.

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x x x x x x.”

It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.” Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a “trust account” among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a “trust account” is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term “deposit.”

In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.” In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.

The ruling in the “Association” case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.

The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR’s valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents’ properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the “Association” case) that is, however, misplaced.

Vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.


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