CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOB B.
MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondentsG.R. No. 103102 | March 6, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner was originally charged for the crime of
frustrated murder. However, after the prosecution had rested its case, the
victim, Maureen Navarro Hultman, died. Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio
A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended
information, which elevates the crime charged from frustrated murder to murder,
and to admit said amended information.
Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, as well as a
rejoinder to the reply of the prosecution. On Nov. 13, 1991, the trial court
issued the questioned order admitting the amended information.
At the scheduled arraignment, petitioner refused to be
arraigned on the amended information for lack of a preliminary investigation
thereon. By reason of such refusal, respondent judge ordered that a plea of
“not guilty” be entered for petitioner.
When petitioner’s counsel manifested that he would not take
part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised, the trial court
appointed a counse de oficio to represent herein petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an amended information involving a
substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution
has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.
RULING:
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides: “Sec. 14. Amendment.—The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave
and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not
be placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give
bail for their appearance at the trial.”
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the
information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution
of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be
posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made
before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following
respects:
1.
Amendment may involve either formal or
substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial
change from the original charge;
2.
Amendment before plea has been entered can be
effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with
leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;
3.
Where the amendment is only as to form, there is
no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of
the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation
is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and
4.
An amended information refers to the same
offense charged in the original information or to an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial
amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over
the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be
withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand,
substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the
original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an
amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution
of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the
second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of
the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense
which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is
in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence
to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the
first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of,
or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense
charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter.
And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.
Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated
murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of murder, hence the former
is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential
element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as
treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an information for
frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same
material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed
for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential
elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to
convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of
offenses charged in both the original and the amended information. What is
involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged,
but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated
to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an amendment of the
original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the
amended information for murder is proper.
Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of
form or substance, may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to
the charge and, thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of court.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
court. All other matters are merely of form.
Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not
charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original
one; (3) additional allegations which do
not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the
accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused,
such as his right to invoke prescription.
Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the
trial but only as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused
to the rights of the accused. The test
of whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by
such amendment has been said to be whether or not a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be equally available after the
amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence the accused might have would
be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other; if
the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of
substance.
An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder
filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the
offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional
allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely
supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the
crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the
victim continues to be the prosecution’s theory. There is no question that
whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for
frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder. Under
the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended
information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed
even during the trial of the case.
It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment
was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary
investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing
of the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does
not violate petitioner’s right to be secured against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation
of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to
petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially the
same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, if
the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an
inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into
the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary.
Comments
Post a Comment