CASE DIGEST: Cabrera v. Gateruela et. al

 


VALENTIN CABRERA, MANUEL CABRERA, and REBECCA LESLIE CABRAS, petitioners, vs. ELIZABETH GATERUELA, EULOGIO ABABON, LEONIDA LIGAN, MARIETTO ABABON, GLORIA PANAL, LEONORA OZARIZA, SOTERO ABABON, JR., and JOSEPH ABABON, respondents
G.R. No. 164213                |              April 21, 2009

 

FACTS:

The heirs of Arcadio JJaca executed a notarized document known as “Kasabutan nga Hinigala” which stipulate that all inherited properties of Arcadio would go to Peregrina Jaca Cabrera. However in a Repartition Project approved by Judge Mendoza of the CFI of Cebu, Lot Nos. 3635-CC and 3635-Y were given to Urbana Jaca Ababon, mother of the respondents. Upon Urbana’s death in 1997, respondents inherited the lots.

Valentin Cabrera, Manuel Cabrera, and Rebecca Leslie Cabras occupied the lots with the knowledge and consent of respondents.

Respondents alleged petitioners were occupying portions of the lots without paying any rentals, but with an agreement that they would vacate the premises and demolish their houses at their expense should respondents need the property. In 2001, respondents personally notified petitioners that they would repossess the property. Respondents asked petitioners to vacate the premises and remove the houses they built on the lots. However, despite repeated demands, petitioners refused to vacate the premises.

Petitioners assailed the Project of Partition as incredible because its first page was missing and it lacked the signatures of the parties who executed it. Petitioners asserted the validity of the “Kasabutan nga Hinigala.” Cabras alleged that as owner of Lot No. 3635 upon Peregrina’s death, she could not be ejected from the premises. Valentin and Manuel alleged that they could not be ejected because they built their houses with Peregrina’s knowledge and consent.

ISSUE:

Whether tolerance as a ground for ejectment is tenable in this case

RULING:

It is settled that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

1.       initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

2.       eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;

3.       thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;

4.       within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In this case, the complaint alleged that petitioners were occupying the property, with agreement that should respondents need the property, petitioners would relinquish possession of the lots and demolish their houses at their expense. Respondents personally notified petitioners to vacate the premises and to demolish their houses but petitioners refused to vacate the lots. The complaint established that petitioners’ possession was by tolerance of respondents, and their possession became illegal when they refused to vacate the premises upon demand by respondents. Here, the possession became illegal not from the time petitioners started occupying the property but from the time demand was made for them to vacate the premises. In short, the complaint sufficiently established a case for unlawful detainer.

“In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. However, where the issue of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon the issue of ownership in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. However, this adjudication is only an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The lower court’s adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership.


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