LAILA G. DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs., THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B. DACARRA and ERLINDA P. ORAYAN, respondents
G.R. No. 147932 | January 25, 2006
FACTS:
The petition stems from the denial of the DOJ secretary of
petitioner Laila G. De Ocampo’s petition for review of the investigating
prosecutor’s finding of probable cause against her for the crime of homicide.
De Ocampo was the teacher of respondent Magdalena Dacarra’s
son, Ronald. On Dec. 4, 1999, 9-yr. old Ronald complained of dizziness upon arriving
home. Ronald then vomited prompting Magdalena to ask what happened. Ronal
replied that petitioner banged his head against that of his classmate Lorendo Orayan.
Magdalena inspected Ronald’s head and saw a woundless contusion. Ronald
eventually died on Dec. 9, 1999.
During the inquest proceeding on Dec. 14, 1999, Assistant QC
Prosecutor Maria Lelibet Sampaga ruled the case is not proper for inquest as
the incident complained of happened on Dec. 4, 1999. Further, the inquest
prosecutor found the evidence insufficient to support the charge for homicide
against De Ocampo.
Subsequently, the case was referred to Assistant QC
Prosecutor Lorna F. Catris-Chua Cheng for preliminary investigation. The investigating prosecutor issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for the offense charged.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review with
the DOJ. In her appeal to the DOJ, petitioner contended that the investigating
prosecutor showed bias in favor of complainants Magdalena and Erlinda for not
conducting a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procuring the autopsy report.
Petitioner argued that the investigating prosecutor erred in concluding that her
alleged act of banging Ronald and Lorendo’s heads was the cause of Ronald’s
injury and that such was an act of child abuse. Petitioner also alleged that it
is the Office of the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over the case, and not
the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.
The DOJ Secretary denied the petition for review. The DOJ
Secretary rejected petitioner’s claim that she is innocent as held by the inquest
prosecutor. The inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case. She merely recommended
petitioner’s release for further investigation since the case was not proper
for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient. Moreover, the DOJ Secretary
ruled that whether the statements of the causes of death in the death
certificate and autopsy report are hearsay, and whether Jennilyn Quirong and
Melanie Lugales have immature perception, are evidentiary matters which should
be determined during trial.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was denied due process for the lack of
clarificatory hearing
Whether there is probable cause against petitioner
RULING:
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that she was denied
due process when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing.
A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation. Rather
than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the
investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term “may” in Section 3(e)
of Rule 112. The use of the word “may” in a statute commonly denotes that it is
directory in nature. The term “may” is generally permissive only and operates
to confer discretion. Under Section 3(e) of Rule 112, it is within the
discretion of the investigation officer whether to set the case for further hearings
to clarify some matters.
In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer conducted
hearings after petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. This simply means
that at that point the investigating prosecutor believed that there were no
more matters for clarification. It is only in petitioner’s mind that some
“crucial points” still exist and need clarification. In any event, petitioner
can raise these “important” matters during the trial proper.
Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties
were accorded equal rights in arguing their case and presenting their
respective evidence during the preliminary investigation. Due process is merely
an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of due
process since she was given the opportunity of a hearing.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not
a trial of the case on the merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether the respondent is probably guilty of the
crime. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is already satisfied that he
can reasonably determine the existence of probable cause based on the parties’
evidence thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and resolve the case.
There is probable cause for the offenses charged against
petitioner. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty of the crime. What is determined during
preliminary investigation is only probable cause, not proof beyond reasonable
doubt. As implied by the words themselves, “probable cause” is concerned with
probability, not absolute or moral certainty.
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