CASE DIGEST: De Lima v. Reyes

 

SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO; ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO and ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN, petitioners, vs. MARIO JOEL T. REYES, respondent
G.R. No. 209330                  |          January 11, 2016

FACTS:

Dr. Gerardo Ortega, a veterinarian and anchor of several shows in Palawan, was shot dead by Marlon Recamata. Recamato also implicated Rodolfo “Bumar” O. Edrad, Dennis C. Arans, and Armando “Salbakotah” R. Noel, Jr. Edrad alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.

On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima created a special panel of prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation. On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and dismissed the complaint.

On June 28, 2011, Dr. Patricia Gloria Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Gov. Reyes and Edrad but it was denied by the First Panel.

In the interest of service and due process, the Secretary of Justice created a new panel of investigators to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of information on all accused.

Reyes filed before the Court for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injuction and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading the RTC of Palawan.

Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice had no authority to order motu propio the reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argues that all parties had already been given the opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority and argued that her creation of the second panel was a purely executive function and not a quasi-judicial function. They point out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Petitioners’ position was that the First Panel “appeared to have ignored the rules of preliminary investigation” when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the determination of the existence of probable cause. They assert that respondent was not deprived of due process when the reinvestigation was ordered since he was not prevented from presenting controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega’s additional evidence. Petitioners argue that since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within the discretion of the trial court.

Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice’s discretion to create a new panel of prosecutors was not “unbridled” since the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be compelling circumstances for her to be able to designate another prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. He argues that the Second Panel’s Resolution was void since the Panel was created by a department order that was beyond the Secretary of Justice’s authority to issue. He further argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by the Second Panel was void.

ISSUE:

Whether the creation of the Second Panel was an executive function

Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu propio another panel of prosecutor in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case

Whether the Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court

RULING:

The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

A quasi-judicial function is “the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a court.

In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines “whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.” As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions.

In Santos v. Go:

The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case.

An act is considered ministerial if “an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.” In contrast, an act is considered discretionary “if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed.”63 Considering that “full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation,” the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial.

A criminal prosecution is initiated by the filing of a complaint to a prosecutor who shall then conduct a preliminary investigation in order to determine whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial in court. The recommendation of the investigating prosecutor on whether to dismiss the complaint or to file the corresponding information in court is still subject to the approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. However, a party is not precluded from appealing the resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice.

The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice can reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct of a reinvestigation in order to resolve the petition for review.

Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu propio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for review. The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly act on any “probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor.” Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice.

It is settled that executive determination of probable cause is different from the judicial determination of probable cause. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.