SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART
ALLAN A. MARIANO; ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO and ASSISTANT
STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN, petitioners, vs. MARIO JOEL T. REYES,
respondent
G.R. No. 209330
| January
11, 2016
FACTS:
Dr. Gerardo Ortega, a veterinarian
and anchor of several shows in Palawan, was shot dead by Marlon Recamata.
Recamato also implicated Rodolfo “Bumar” O. Edrad, Dennis C. Arans, and Armando
“Salbakotah” R. Noel, Jr. Edrad alleged that it was former Palawan Governor
Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.
On February 7, 2011, Secretary of
Justice Leila De Lima created a special panel of prosecutors to conduct
preliminary investigation. On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its
preliminary investigation and dismissed the complaint.
On June 28, 2011, Dr. Patricia Gloria
Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation,
which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications
between former Gov. Reyes and Edrad but it was denied by the First Panel.
In the interest of service and due
process, the Secretary of Justice created a new panel of investigators to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel issued a Resolution
finding probable cause and recommending the filing of information on all
accused.
Reyes filed before the Court for
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injuction and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading the RTC of Palawan.
Respondent argues that the Secretary
of Justice had no authority to order motu propio the reinvestigation of the
case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new evidence to
the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He
argues that all parties had already been given the opportunity to present their
evidence before the First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a
reinvestigation.
On the other hand, petitioners argue
that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority and argued that her
creation of the second panel was a purely executive function and not a
quasi-judicial function. They point out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and
the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a
new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.
Petitioners’ position was that the
First Panel “appeared to have ignored the rules of preliminary investigation”
when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for
the determination of the existence of probable cause. They assert that
respondent was not deprived of due process when the reinvestigation was ordered
since he was not prevented from presenting controverting evidence to Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega’s additional evidence. Petitioners argue that since the
Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within the
discretion of the trial court.
Respondent argues that the Secretary
of Justice’s discretion to create a new panel of prosecutors was not
“unbridled” since the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be compelling
circumstances for her to be able to designate another prosecutor to conduct the
reinvestigation. He argues that the Second Panel’s Resolution was void since
the Panel was created by a department order that was beyond the Secretary of
Justice’s authority to issue. He further argues that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by the Second
Panel was void.
ISSUE:
Whether the creation of the Second
Panel was an executive function
Whether the Secretary of Justice is
authorized to create motu propio another panel of prosecutor in order to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case
Whether the Petition for Certiorari
has already been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court
RULING:
The determination by the Department
of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or
reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review
if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
A quasi-judicial function is “the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Otherwise stated, an
administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards,
determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same
effect as the judgment of a court.
In a preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The
prosecutor only determines “whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.” As such, the prosecutor
does not perform quasi-judicial functions.
In Santos v. Go:
The prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does
not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation
is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare
his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be
acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public
prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in
nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the
prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary
prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or
agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews
the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any
case.
An act is considered ministerial if
“an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a
prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.” In contrast, an
act is considered discretionary “if the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed.”63 Considering that “full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation,” the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary
of Justice are not ministerial.
A criminal prosecution is initiated
by the filing of a complaint to a prosecutor who shall then conduct a
preliminary investigation in order to determine whether there is probable cause
to hold the accused for trial in court. The recommendation of the investigating
prosecutor on whether to dismiss the complaint or to file the corresponding
information in court is still subject to the approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. However, a party is not precluded from
appealing the resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice.
The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires
the filing of a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice can
reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct
of a reinvestigation in order to resolve the petition for review.
Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu propio reverse or
modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state
prosecutor even without a pending petition for review. The Secretary of Justice
exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her
authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her
prosecutors.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071
also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly act on any
“probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution
staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city
prosecutor.” Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a
reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition from a party in order
to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice.
It is settled that executive
determination of probable cause is different from the judicial determination of
probable cause. The executive determination of probable cause is one made
during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to
the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed
the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or
not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has
been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has
made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass
upon.
The judicial determination of
probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity
for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to
issue the arrest warrant.
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