MAJOR
GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATION DEFENSE
VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN.
EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.),
DIRECTOR BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondents
G.R.
No. 198554 | July
30, 2010
FACTS:
Garcia, tried by the Special General
Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation of the 96th
Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of
the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military
Discipline) for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019,
as amended in relation to RA 6713.
Garcia, among others, argued that the
confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year detention in a
penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement
subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on
December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and two months.
He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center, and later to the Camp Crame Custodial
Detention Center. Accused has been in confinement since October 18, 2004.
Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week
after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial against him, Garcia
was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the
maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP
stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is
separate and distinct from ordinary courts.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Garcia’s right to speedy
trial was violated
RULING:
No less than our Constitution guarantees
the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy disposition of cases.
However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and
flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. In determining whether or not the right to the speedy
disposition of cases has been violated, the Supreme Court has laid down the
following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
In this case, there was no allegation,
whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being questioned by
petitioner is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President.
Basically, the case has already been decided by the General Court Martial and
has also been reviewed by the proper reviewing authorities without any delay.
The only thing missing then was the confirmation of sentence by the President.
The records do not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the decision
of the General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence was finally
confirmed by the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his
right to a speedy disposition of his case.
This is akin to what happened in Guerrero
v. Court of Appeals, where, in spite of the lapse of more than ten years of
delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not rightfully complain
of delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case,
since he was part of the reason for the failure of his case to move on towards
its ultimate resolution.
Time runs against the slothful and those
who neglect their rights. In fact, the delay in the confirmation of his
sentence was to his own advantage, because without the confirmation from the
President, his sentence cannot be served.
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