MOBILIA
PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HAJIME UMEZAWA, respondent
G.R.
No. 149357 | March
4, 2005
FACTS:
Mobilia Products, Inc. is a corporation
engaged in the manufacture and export of quality furniture which caters only to
the purchase orders booked and placed through Mobilia Products Japan, the
mother company which does all the marketing and booking. Mobilia Products Japan
sent Hajime Umezawa to the Philippines in order to head Mobilia Products, Inc.
as President and General Manager.
Sometime in the last week of January
1995, Umezawa, along with his wife and sister, organized another company, Astem
Philippines Corporation, which would be engaged in the same business as
Mobilia, without the knowledge of the Chairman and other members of the Board
of Directors of Mobilia.
To accelerate the market potentials of
Astem, Astem would participate in the International Furniture Fair 1995 held at
the World Trade Centre of Singapore. One of the requirements of such Fair was
that the furniture exhibits must arrive and be received at Singapore not later
than February 23, 1995.
However, with no equipment and machinery
nor staff and ready personnel, Astem was running out of time to meet the
deadline.
Umezawa, with grave abuse of the
confidence reposed on him as President and General Manager of Mobilia Products,
Inc., and in conspiracy with his wife, his sister Mitsuyo Yaguchi, Yoshikazu
Hayano and Justin Legaspi, all with intent to gain for themselves and for their
company stole prototype furniture from petitioner Mobilia so that the said
pieces of furniture would be presented and exhibited as belonging to Astem in
the International Furniture Fair ’95 in Singapore.
On May 2, 1995, the Board of Directors of
MPI filed a complaint for 2 counts of qualified theft against Umezawa.
On September 25, 1995, Umezawa filed a
petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for the
nullification of the Resolution issued by the three alleged members of MPI
Board of Directors, authorizing the filing of criminal complaints against him
in behalf of the corporation.
After investigation, the public
prosecutor filed an Information for qualified theft against Umezawa on February
20, 1996.
On April 25, 1996, Umezawa filed a motion
for the suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of his
petition with the SEC. The trial court, however denied the said motion. It held
that the filing and the pendency of a petition before the SEC did not warrant a
suspension of the criminal cases.
On January 29, 1999, the trial court
issued a Joint Order dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction. It held
that the dispute between the private complainant and the accused over the
ownership of the properties subject of the charges is intra-corporate in
nature, and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. The private and
public prosecutors received their respective copies of the Joint Order on
February 2, 1999.
The MPI, through the private prosecutor,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the court and for the
reinstatement of the cases on February 15, 1999. The MPI maintained that the
trial court had jurisdiction over the cases and cited Section 5 of P.D. No.
902-A, which provides the rules on cases over which the SEC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction. A copy of the motion was served on the public
prosecutor for his approval. However, the public prosecutor did not affix his
conformity to the motion, and instead opted to appear before the trial court
during the hearing of the same. During the hearing, both the public and private
prosecutors appeared. In support of his motion, the private prosecutor argued
that the trial of the case must be done in the presence of and under the
control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
The trial court denied the motion. It
held that the SEC, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies. It also ruled that the motion of the private complainant was pro
forma, it appearing that the public prosecutor had not approved the same.
The public prosecutor received a copy of
the Order on April 20, 1999. On April 26, 1999, the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA
against Presiding Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez and Umezawa. The CA allowed the
MPI to intervene as petitioner, and admitted its petition-in-intervention.
On September 2, 1999, the CA rendered judgment
nullifying the assailed Order of the RTC. Umezawa filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the decision of the CA. In its August 8, 2001 Resolution the
CA granted the motion and reversed its decision. It affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.
The CA held that the Public Prosecutor
failed to file a motion for the reconsideration of the trial court’s January
29, 1999 Joint Order dismissing the cases, that is, within fifteen days from
receipt of a copy of the said order on February 2, 1999; neither did the People
appeal the said Order within the period therefor. Thus, according to the CA,
the People filed its petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court only on April 26,
1999, well beyond the 60-day period therefor. The appellate court, likewise,
held that the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the said Joint Order
by the private prosecutor without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor did
not toll the period for the People to file its motion for reconsideration
thereof, or to appeal therefrom, or to file a petition for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus. It ruled that, having lost its right to appeal in due
course, the People was proscribed from filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus. The CA declared that the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner MPI of the Joint Order of the RTC is pro forma, the public
prosecutor not having signified his written conformity thereto.
The petitioner People of the Philippines
insists that while the public prosecutor did not expressly conform to the
motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial
court filed by the private prosecutor, through the public prosecutor’s presence
during the hearing of the said motion, his supervision and control over the
private prosecutor during the said hearing, he in effect adopted and conformed
to the said motion for reconsideration.
In his comment on the petitions,
respondent Umezawa maintains that the motion for reconsideration of the joint
order of the trial court filed by the private prosecutor did not interrupt the
period within which the People could appeal. The respondent posits that the
finding of the trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, that the public prosecutor
did not conform to the motion for reconsideration of the private prosecutor, is
binding on this Court. The respondent also avers that the petitioner has no
personality to file the petition. Moreover, he insists that whether the public
prosecutor conformed to the private prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration is
a question of fact which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the motion
for reconsideration by the private prosecutor interrupted the period within
which the public prosecutor could appeal
RULING:
All criminal actions commenced by
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosecutor. When the civil action for civil liability is instituted in
the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of the
offense.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the SC
held that under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel,
who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and
in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A
separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and
time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the
case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution
of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one
composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The
prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to
deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate
him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain
social order.
The intervention of the private offended
party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be under the
control and supervision of the public prosecutor until the final termination of
the case. A public prosecutor who has been entrusted by law with the
prosecution of criminal cases is duty-bound to take charge thereof until its
final termination, for under the law, he assumes full responsibility for his
failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to
its termination. The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Indeed, the
sole purpose of the civil action is the resolution, reparation or indemnification
of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason
of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.
Thus, when the offended party, through
counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to
consider his appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.
The public prosecutor may turn over the
actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his discretion, but
he may, at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial. However, it is
necessary that the public prosecutor be present at the trial until the final
termination of the case; otherwise, if he is absent, it cannot be gainsaid that
the trial is under his supervision and control.
In a criminal case in which the offended
party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended
party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken,
whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned
and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by
the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may
not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect
of the case. However, the offended party or private complainant may file a
motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom
but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the
private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the
public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the
private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for
certiorari or mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The public and private prosecutors are
not precluded, whenever feasible, from filing a joint motion for the
reconsideration of the dismissal of the case or the acquittal of the accused,
on the criminal and civil aspects of the cases.
In the present case, only petitioner MPI,
through counsel, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the trial court’s
Joint Order dated January 29, 1999, praying for the reinstatement of the cases
insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. The public prosecutor did not
approve nor conform to the said motion. Although petitioner MPI provided ample
space for the said conformity of the public prosecutor, the latter did not do
so; he merely appeared during the hearing of the said motion with the private
prosecutor when the latter presented his oral arguments in support of the said
motion.
The fact that the public prosecutor did
not conform to the said motion, however, does not mean that the same is pro
forma. It must be stressed that the propriety and efficacy of the motion,
insofar as the civil aspect of the cases is concerned, is not dependent upon
the conformity of the public prosecutor. Hence, the filing of the joint motion
for reconsideration effectively suspended the running of the period for
petitioner MPI to assail the joint order in the CA via an appeal or a special
civil action for certiorari or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
However, since the public prosecutor did
not file any motion for the reconsideration of the joint order nor conform to
the motion of petitioner MPI, insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases is
concerned, the period for the State to assail the said joint order was not
suspended. Only the motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor
of the joint order of dismissal of the cases could have tolled the period
within which the State could appeal, insofar as the criminal aspect of the
cases was concerned. The bare fact that the public prosecutor appeared for the
State during the hearing of the motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI
does not amount to or constitute his adoption of the said motion as that of the
State.
As ruled in Cabral v. Puno:
While it is true that the offended party,
Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not
stop the running of the period for appeal. He did not have the legal
personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The
prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the
direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or
appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal.
Even then, the Court still holds that the
CA erred in dismissing the petition of the People of the Philippines simply
because the public prosecutor erred in not himself filing a motion for
reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court, on his perception that
by being present during the hearing of the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner MPI, he thereby adopted the said motion as that of the State’s. The
settled rule is that the State is not estopped by the mistakes of its officers
and employees.
Comments
Post a Comment