CASE DIGEST: Mobilia Products Inc. v. Hajime Umezawa

 

MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HAJIME UMEZAWA, respondent
G.R. No. 149357                    |          March 4, 2005

 

FACTS:

Mobilia Products, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of quality furniture which caters only to the purchase orders booked and placed through Mobilia Products Japan, the mother company which does all the marketing and booking. Mobilia Products Japan sent Hajime Umezawa to the Philippines in order to head Mobilia Products, Inc. as President and General Manager.

Sometime in the last week of January 1995, Umezawa, along with his wife and sister, organized another company, Astem Philippines Corporation, which would be engaged in the same business as Mobilia, without the knowledge of the Chairman and other members of the Board of Directors of Mobilia.

To accelerate the market potentials of Astem, Astem would participate in the International Furniture Fair 1995 held at the World Trade Centre of Singapore. One of the requirements of such Fair was that the furniture exhibits must arrive and be received at Singapore not later than February 23, 1995.

However, with no equipment and machinery nor staff and ready personnel, Astem was running out of time to meet the deadline.

Umezawa, with grave abuse of the confidence reposed on him as President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., and in conspiracy with his wife, his sister Mitsuyo Yaguchi, Yoshikazu Hayano and Justin Legaspi, all with intent to gain for themselves and for their company stole prototype furniture from petitioner Mobilia so that the said pieces of furniture would be presented and exhibited as belonging to Astem in the International Furniture Fair ’95 in Singapore.

On May 2, 1995, the Board of Directors of MPI filed a complaint for 2 counts of qualified theft against Umezawa.

On September 25, 1995, Umezawa filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for the nullification of the Resolution issued by the three alleged members of MPI Board of Directors, authorizing the filing of criminal complaints against him in behalf of the corporation.

After investigation, the public prosecutor filed an Information for qualified theft against Umezawa on February 20, 1996.

On April 25, 1996, Umezawa filed a motion for the suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of his petition with the SEC. The trial court, however denied the said motion. It held that the filing and the pendency of a petition before the SEC did not warrant a suspension of the criminal cases.

On January 29, 1999, the trial court issued a Joint Order dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the dispute between the private complainant and the accused over the ownership of the properties subject of the charges is intra-corporate in nature, and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. The private and public prosecutors received their respective copies of the Joint Order on February 2, 1999.

The MPI, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the court and for the reinstatement of the cases on February 15, 1999. The MPI maintained that the trial court had jurisdiction over the cases and cited Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, which provides the rules on cases over which the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction. A copy of the motion was served on the public prosecutor for his approval. However, the public prosecutor did not affix his conformity to the motion, and instead opted to appear before the trial court during the hearing of the same. During the hearing, both the public and private prosecutors appeared. In support of his motion, the private prosecutor argued that the trial of the case must be done in the presence of and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

The trial court denied the motion. It held that the SEC, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. It also ruled that the motion of the private complainant was pro forma, it appearing that the public prosecutor had not approved the same.

The public prosecutor received a copy of the Order on April 20, 1999. On April 26, 1999, the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA against Presiding Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez and Umezawa. The CA allowed the MPI to intervene as petitioner, and admitted its petition-in-intervention.

On September 2, 1999, the CA rendered judgment nullifying the assailed Order of the RTC. Umezawa filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the CA. In its August 8, 2001 Resolution the CA granted the motion and reversed its decision. It affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

The CA held that the Public Prosecutor failed to file a motion for the reconsideration of the trial court’s January 29, 1999 Joint Order dismissing the cases, that is, within fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the said order on February 2, 1999; neither did the People appeal the said Order within the period therefor. Thus, according to the CA, the People filed its petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court only on April 26, 1999, well beyond the 60-day period therefor. The appellate court, likewise, held that the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the said Joint Order by the private prosecutor without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor did not toll the period for the People to file its motion for reconsideration thereof, or to appeal therefrom, or to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. It ruled that, having lost its right to appeal in due course, the People was proscribed from filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The CA declared that the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner MPI of the Joint Order of the RTC is pro forma, the public prosecutor not having signified his written conformity thereto.

The petitioner People of the Philippines insists that while the public prosecutor did not expressly conform to the motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court filed by the private prosecutor, through the public prosecutor’s presence during the hearing of the said motion, his supervision and control over the private prosecutor during the said hearing, he in effect adopted and conformed to the said motion for reconsideration.

In his comment on the petitions, respondent Umezawa maintains that the motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court filed by the private prosecutor did not interrupt the period within which the People could appeal. The respondent posits that the finding of the trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, that the public prosecutor did not conform to the motion for reconsideration of the private prosecutor, is binding on this Court. The respondent also avers that the petitioner has no personality to file the petition. Moreover, he insists that whether the public prosecutor conformed to the private prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration is a question of fact which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of the motion for reconsideration by the private prosecutor interrupted the period within which the public prosecutor could appeal

RULING:

All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. When the civil action for civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of the offense.

In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the SC held that under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.

The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor until the final termination of the case. A public prosecutor who has been entrusted by law with the prosecution of criminal cases is duty-bound to take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law, he assumes full responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination. The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the civil action is the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.

Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.

The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary that the public prosecutor be present at the trial until the final termination of the case; otherwise, if he is absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control.

In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case. However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorari or mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The public and private prosecutors are not precluded, whenever feasible, from filing a joint motion for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the case or the acquittal of the accused, on the criminal and civil aspects of the cases.

In the present case, only petitioner MPI, through counsel, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the trial court’s Joint Order dated January 29, 1999, praying for the reinstatement of the cases insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. The public prosecutor did not approve nor conform to the said motion. Although petitioner MPI provided ample space for the said conformity of the public prosecutor, the latter did not do so; he merely appeared during the hearing of the said motion with the private prosecutor when the latter presented his oral arguments in support of the said motion.

The fact that the public prosecutor did not conform to the said motion, however, does not mean that the same is pro forma. It must be stressed that the propriety and efficacy of the motion, insofar as the civil aspect of the cases is concerned, is not dependent upon the conformity of the public prosecutor. Hence, the filing of the joint motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the running of the period for petitioner MPI to assail the joint order in the CA via an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

However, since the public prosecutor did not file any motion for the reconsideration of the joint order nor conform to the motion of petitioner MPI, insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases is concerned, the period for the State to assail the said joint order was not suspended. Only the motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor of the joint order of dismissal of the cases could have tolled the period within which the State could appeal, insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases was concerned. The bare fact that the public prosecutor appeared for the State during the hearing of the motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI does not amount to or constitute his adoption of the said motion as that of the State.

As ruled in Cabral v. Puno:

While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal.

Even then, the Court still holds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition of the People of the Philippines simply because the public prosecutor erred in not himself filing a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court, on his perception that by being present during the hearing of the motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI, he thereby adopted the said motion as that of the State’s. The settled rule is that the State is not estopped by the mistakes of its officers and employees.