PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO OLING MADRAGA, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 129299 | November 15, 2000
FACTS:
Rodolfo Oling Madraga was charged with 2 counts of rape committed against his own 16-year old daughter, Fe C. Madraga.
At the arraignment on November 4, 1996, accused-appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Antonio D. Banico, entered separate pleas of not guilty for each case. Thereafter, the trial proper of the cases was set to November 18, 19, and 20, 1996.
On November 18, 1996, the counsel for the accused, moved that they be given time up to December to talk with complainant’s mother so that the accused will plead guilty to the first case, but will seek for the dismissal of the Second case. The complainant’s mother, who was in
Court, manifested that she does not agree to the proposition. Trial of the cases was re-set to December 2, 3 & 4, 1996.
On December 2, 1996, counsel for the accused manifested that the accused was willing to enter a plea of guilty to the crime of rape, which was committed in the month of May, 1995, provided that the other case be tried on another date.
On December 10, 1996, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of Death.
Two Appellant’s Briefs were filed with this Court—one filed by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti Death Penalty Task Force, and another one filed by Public Attorney Antonio D. Banico, appellant’s counsel.
FLAG, argues that the trial judge failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the accused’s plea of guilty to the capital offense, as mandated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, this case should be remanded to the court of origin for further and appropriate proceedings.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the plea of guilty of accused appellant is null and void
Whether or not the Court violated Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
RULING:
The contention of FLAG would have been correct were it not for the circumstance that accused-appellant did not, in fact, plead guilty to a capital offense in the first place.
In order for rape to be punishable with death, the information/complaint must properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the victim, and the latter’s minority, and the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, in the same manner that circumstances that qualify a killing to murder, must be alleged in the information, and also proved beyond reasonable doubt during the trial. Failure to allege the fact of filiation and minority in the information for rape is fatal and consequently bars conviction of its qualified form which is punishable with death.
In the case at bar, such relationship is not stated in the “cause of the accusation,” or in the narration of the act or omission constituting the offense, but only in the preamble or opening statement of the complaint. The complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not state in the specifications of the acts constitutive of the offense, that he is charged as the father of the victim. Such omission is prejudicial to the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusations against him.
On this matter, Atty. Banico correctly pointed out that only the first paragraph of the complaint mentions the age of the private complainant and the relationship of the accused to the private complainant, i.e., that the accused is the father of the private complainant. Atty. Banico is correct in arguing that the first paragraph of the complaint is not part of the allegation of the charge for rape to which appellant pleaded guilty. Therefore, said complaint charges only simple rape under Art. 335, for which the penalty is only reclusion perpetua, and not for rape under R.A. 7659, qualified by the circumstance that the offender is the father of the victim who is a minor, for which the penalty is death.
Since the appellant did not plead guilty to a capital offense, he cannot properly invoke Sec. 3, Rule 116.
Accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty, but it appears from the records of the proceedings before the court a quo that the same was a conditional plea, because appellant’s counsel argued that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and drunkenness should be appreciated in favor of the appellant. While the records do not show
that appellant entered his plea with the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, this can be inferred from the arguments made by his counsel during the hearing on December 2, 1996, and in the appellant’s brief filed by said counsel, asking that appellant be entitled to the benefit of the plea.
A conditional plea of guilty, or one entered subject to the provision that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered.
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