JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. ASUNCION G. FERRER,
substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed
G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, respondentsG.R. No. 187056 | September 20, 2010
FACTS:
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe
Gonzales executed a document entitled “Donation Mortis Causa” in favor of their
two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini covering
the spouses’ 126-square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila. The
deed of donation reads:
“It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable
and shall be respected by the surviving spouse.
Xxx
xxx
It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves
the right, ownership, possession and administration of this property herein
donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall be operative and
effective upon the death of the DONORS.”
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, the deed
had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named
donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.
Guadalupe died n September 1968. A few months later, Leopoldo,
the executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject
property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972.
In 1998 Jarabini filed a “petition for the probate of the August
27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa” before the RTC. Asuncion opposed the
petition, invoking Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in the property
to her.
The RTC ruled that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos,
the donors’ intention being to transfer title over the property to the donees
during the donors’ lifetime, given its irrevocability. Consequently, said the
RTC, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the property
was void since he had nothing to assign.
The CA reversed the RTC’s decision. The CA held that, since
no proceeding exists for the allowance of what Jarabini claimed was actually a
donation inter vivos, the RTC erred in deciding the case the way it did.
Further, it held that the donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply
with the requirements of a notarial will, rendering the same void.
ISSUE:
Whether the donation in question is a donation mortis causa
or a donation inter vivos
RULING:
That the document in question in this case was captioned
“Donation Mortis Causa” is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a
donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact
that the donor styles it mortis causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
“irrevocability” is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa, where “revocability” is precisely the essence of the
act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before
the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable
by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express
“irrevocability” of the donation is the “distinctive
standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos.” Here, the
donors plainly said that it is “our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall
be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse.” The intent to
make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a
surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently,
the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the “right, ownership,
possession, and administration of the property” and made the donation operative
upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum)
in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted
with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property
while they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation,
which acceptance the deed required. The Court held that an acceptance clause
indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only
for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a
will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.
Finally, as Justice J.B.L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida,
in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed. Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos,
it was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of
donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s acceptance
of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the
property donated.
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