FE QUIJANO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, respondent
G.R. No. 64277 | October 8, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners
and her siblings inherited from their father a parcel of land with an area of
15,790 sq m more or less. On April 23, 1990, prior to any partition among the
heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share to respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante.
On July 25,
1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3 portion of
his share in the property to the respondent, with their deed of absolute sale
stating that the sale was with the approval of Eliseo’s siblings, and
describing the portion subject of the sale as right at the back of the seminary
facing Japer Memorial School and where the fence and house of Atty. Amante is
located.
On Sept.
30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition to divide their father’s estate among themselves. The partition
resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being
adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo.
Due to the
petitioner’s needing her portion that was then occupied by the respondent, she
demanded that the latter vacate it. Despite several demands, the respondent
refused to vacate, prompting her to file against him on February 14, 1995 a
complaint for ejectment and damages. She alleged therein that she was the
registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 6555, a portion of
which was being occupied by the respondent, who had constructed a residential
building thereon by the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property she and her
siblings had inherited from their father had not yet been subdivided, and was
thus still co-owned by them; and that the respondent’s occupation had become
illegal following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands.
The respondent
denied that his possession of the disputed portion had been by mere tolerance
of Eliseo. He even asserted that he was in fact the owner and lawful possessor
of the property, having bought it from Eliseo; that the petitioner and her
siblings could not deny knowing about the sale in his favor because they could
plainly see his house from the road; and that the deed of absolute sale itself
stated that the sale to him was with their approval, and that they had already
known that his house and fence were existing; that before he purchased the
property, Eliseo informed him that he and his coheirs had already orally partitioned
the estate of their father, and that the portion being sold to him was Eliseo’s
share; and that with his having already purchased the property before the
petitioner acquired it under the deed of extrajudicial partition, she should
respect his ownership and possession of it.
ISSUE:
Who has the
better right to the possession of the disputed property
RULING:
The
disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the late Bibiano
Quijano, and passed on to his heirs by operation of law upon his death. Prior
to the partition, the estate was owned in common by the heirs, subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased. In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or
right belong to different persons, with each of them holding the property pro
indiviso and exercising her rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may
use and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a
division is actually made, the respective share of each cannot be determined,
and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint
ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of
it.
Even if an
heir’s right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and
partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives
the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership. Accordingly, when Eliseo sold
the disputed property to the respondent in 1990 and 1991, he was only a
co-owner along with his siblings, and could sell only that portion that would
be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not
vest ownership of the disputed property in the respondent but transferred only
the seller’s pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer,
a co-owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned.
As Eliseo’s
successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was vested with the right
under Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in the partition of the estate
and to challenge the partition undertaken without his consent.
For sure,
the respondent was no stranger to the Quijanos, because he himself had served
as the lawyer of Eliseo and the petitioner herself. His knowledge of Eliseo’s
co-ownership with his coheirs, and of their oral agreement of partition
notwithstanding, the respondent still did not exercise his right under Article
497. Although Eliseo made it appear to the respondent that the partition had
already been completed and finalized, the coheirs had not taken possession yet
of their respective shares to signify that they had ratified their agreement,
if any.
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