REMINGTON
INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA CASTANEDA, respondents
G.R. Nos. 169295-96 | November 20, 2006
TOPIC:
Domestic Worker
FACTS:
Erlinda Castaneda alleged that she started
working in August 1983 as company cook for Remington, a corporation engaged in
the trading business. She alleges that she worked for 6 days a week, starting
as early as 6:00 a.m. because she had to do the marketing and would end at
around 5:30 p.m., or even later, after most of the employees, if not all, had
left the company premises.
She continuously worked with Remington
until she was unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work when Remington
transferred to a new site in Edsa, Caloocan City. She averred that she reported
for work at the new site in Caloocan City on January 15, 1998, only to be
informed that Remington no longer needed her services. Erlinda believed that
her dismissal was illegal because she was not given the notices required by
law.
Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda
illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a regular
employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with
Remington’s business of trading in construction or hardware materials, steel
plates and wire rope products. It also contended that contrary to Erlinda’s
allegations that the she worked for 8 hours a day, Erlinda’s duty was merely to
cook lunch and “merienda,” after which her time was hers to spend as she
pleased. Remington also maintained that it did not exercise any degree of
control and/or supervision over Erlinda’s work as her only concern was to
ensure that the employees’ lunch and “merienda” were available and served at
the designated time. Erlinda also did not have to punch any time card in the
way that other employees of Remington did; she was free to roam around the
company premises, read magazines, and to even nap when not doing her assigned
chores. The company also alleged that it was Erlindo who refused to report for
work when Remington moved to a new location in Caloocan city.
The LA ruled that the respondent was a
domestic helper under the personal service of Antonio Tan, finding that her
work as a cook was not usually necessary and desirable in the ordinary course
of trade and business of the petitioner corporation, which operated as a
trading company, and that the latter did not exercise control over her
functions.
ISSUE:
Whether Erlinda, a cook, is a regular
employee of the company or a domestic helper
RULING:
In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC, the
Court held that a househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company was
a regular employee of the said firm. The Court ratiocinated that a househelper or
domestic servant is one who is employed in the employer’s home to minister
exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family. The
criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in
the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of
a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company
staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is
that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the
latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in
business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is
being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the
employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in
the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
The mere fact that the househelper or
domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer
and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses
for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion
that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a
regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or
domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the
Labor Code, as amended.
In the case at bar, the petitioner itself
admits that respondent worked at the company premises and her duty was to cook
and prepare its employees’ lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as well as
the nature of respondent’s work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of
Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of the petitioner’s employees, makes
her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee under the
doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That she works within company
premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of
Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of the petitioner’s
right of control over her functions, which is the primary indicator of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.
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