CASE DIGEST: Clemente v. Workmen's Compensation Commission

 

URSULA VDA. DE CLEMENTE, FOR HERSELF AND FOR HER CHILDREN NAMELY: MARITA, EDNA, AMELIA, ROBERTO, ANTONIO AND REYNALDO, ALL  SURNAMED CLEMENTE, petitioners, vs. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND RATTAN ART AND DECORATIONS INC., respondents
G.R. No. L-42087               |              April 8, 1988

FACTS:

On Feb. 21, 1974, Ricardo Clemente died in his sleep caused by acute cardio-respiratory failure, with manifest pulmonary infarct, cardiac dilatation and marked visceral congestion. His widow and 6 minor children filed a claim for death compensation benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, on account of the death of said deceased.

The Acting Referee of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission rendered a decision in favor of the claimants. Upon referral to the Commission for review, the Commission reversed the decision of the acting referee. It upheld the allegations of the private respondent that the cause of death of the deceased is what is commonly known as “bangungot,” that it is non-compensable, and that the claimants failed to establish the fundamental preliminary link to connect the death of the deceased to his work.

Petitioners claim that the work of the deceased was not only strenuous but also weakened the constitution of the deceased, such that in 1973–1974, he was always complaining of dizziness, severe cough, chest and back pains, over-fatigue and was later found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis and heart failure. However, the petitioners did not submit any proof to substantiate their allegations.

The petitioners further contended that it is for convenience, rather than for accuracy, that some medical practitioners call the causes of death similar to that of the deceased as “bangungot;” but the fact is, no inference was made in the “post mortem certificate of death” that Clemente died of “bangungot."

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is causal relation between the cause of death of the deceased and the nature of his work

RULING:

To be entitled to compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the illness which resulted in the death of the employee must be directly caused by his employment or either aggravated by, or the result of the nature of his employment. The Court has adopted a liberal interpretation of this rule to give effect to the spirit of the law as a social legislation, and has ruled that what the law merely requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct causal relation of the illness or ailment to the job or working conditions present in the course of the performance of one’s duties. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence. In testing the evidence on the relation between the injury or disease and the employment, probability and not certainty is the touchstone.

Moreover, when illness supervenes during employment, there is a disputable presumption that the claim is compensable. The claimant is relieved of the duty to show causation as it is then legally presumed that the illness arose out of the employment. The law presumes, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim for death or disability benefits is compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from the nature of the employment is with the employer. So rigid is this rule that, even where the cause of the employee’s death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists.

While it is true that the claimants failed to prove the causal link between, the cause of the death of the deceased to the nature of his work, the Court cannot discount the probability that his work, as a set-up man, caused or aggravated his illness that led to his death. Considering the nature of the job of the decedent, it may be fairly concluded that the strenuous physical activity required in the performance of his duties caused a heavy strain on his heart, which ultimately resulted in death.

The allegation of respondents that the medical records of the deceased, prior to his death, reveal that he was in good health and the fact that the death of the decedent occurred at a time when he was already off from work is not material; the main consideration for granting death compensation to petitioners is the fact that the illness which resulted in the death of the deceased supervened in the course of his employment. The contention that the deceased had no history of cardiac ailment strengthens the presumption that his fatal heart attack, during the period of his employment, was work-connected or aggravated thereby and therefore compensable.