CASE DIGEST: Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. Workmen's Compensation Commission

 


LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and LEONARDA VDA. DE HAYSON, respondents
G.R. No. L-37896               |              July 22, 1981

FACTS:

The deceased, Pantaleon Hayson, was employed by the respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation as a Gang Boss or capataz. On February 16, 1970 at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, the deceased was on duty on board the M/V President Aguinaldo. While he and his other co-workers were waiting for the cargoes, the 3rd Officer of the M/V President Aguinaldo approached them. Since there was a party on board the boat at that time and since it was a cold night, the deceased asked for something to drink from the 3rd Officer. So, the 3rd Officer later gave them a half-filled bottle of pocket-size Tanduay Rhum. The group then took turns in drinking from the said bottle with the deceased taking the first drink. They later found out that the contents of the said bottle was not liquor but oil of wintergreen. At around 4:40 AM the next day, Pantaleon died due to poisoning.

The Referee ruled that the death of Pantaleon Hayson arose out of and in the course of his employment as capataz and ordered Luzon Stevedoring Corporation to pay compensation and burial expenses.

Herein petitioner filed a motion a motion for reconsideration of the Referee’s decision raising as sole ground the allegation that Pantaleon Hayson was notoriously negligent, hence, his death is not Compensable under Section 4 of Act 3428, as amended. 

ISSUE:

Whether the claim for compensation benefit on account of Pantaleon Hayson’s demise due to accidental poisoning when he mistook oil of wintergreen for Tanduay Rhum falls within the coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.

RULING:

Pantaleon was not notoriously negligent.

In the case at bar, it was established that the deceased was not a heavy drinker and at the time they asked something to drink from the 3rd Officer of the boat, the deceased or his companions were not shown to have drunk any liquor or anything that could have affected the mental state of the deceased at the time he asked a drink from the said Officer. Nor was it shown that previous to the incident, the deceased was so despondent that there was an intention on his part to end his life. All that they did in asking for a drink from the Officer is what ordinary persons would do under the circumstances.

In the nature of their job, occasional drinking is quite ordinary and does not in any way violate standard rules and regulations, unless of course the same is done to the extent of causing drunkenness. Being not a drinker as he was, the deceased could not be expected to know the different tastes of wines. That what he drank contained oil of wintergreen made no difference to him because as stated, he was not a drinker and could not have distinguished the taste of the kind of wine, so much so, that when his companions tasted the wine later, and told him that it contained oil of wintergreen, he even bragged that it was stateside, an act which projected his innocence. And even if he drank after he was told that the bottle contained oil of wintergreen, still the same could not constitute notorious negligence on his part, because there was no showing that he admitted knowledge that the contents of the bottle was oil of wintergreen, nor was there a warning made by his companions that drinking the same could be fatal to him.

To constitute notorious negligence, it must be shown that the act of the deceased entirely wants in care as to raise a presumption that he was conscious of the probable consequences of his carelessness and indifferent to the danger of injury to himself and other persons. It must be equivalent to the doing of an intentional wrong.

In the case of Paez v. WCC, the court defined notorious negligence as something more than mere or simple negligence, or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety.

Acts reasonably necessary to health and comfort of an employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical demands, or protecting himself from excessive cold, are incidental to the employment and injuries sustained in the performance of such acts are compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment.


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