ANACLETO C.
MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, petitioner,
vs. DIONISIO UGAY, respondent
G.R. No.
204926 | December 3, 2014
FACTS:
On Oct. 30,
2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser filed a complaint for Forcible Entry with
Damages against respondent Dionisio Ugay. In his complaint, petitioner alleged
that he was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated in
Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an area of 10,632 square meters and covered
by OCT No. RP-174; that on October 31, 2006, petitioner, discovered that
respondent stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his property by
constructing a residential house thereon without his knowledge and consent; and
that demand letters were sent to respondent but he still refused to vacate the
premises, thus, he was constrained to seek judicial remedy.
Respondent
denied the material allegations of the complaint and put up the following
defenses: that he had been a resident of Samara, Aringay, La Union, since birth
and when he reached the age of reason, he started occupying a parcel of land in
that place then known as Sta. Lucia, Aringay, La Union; that years later, this
parcel of land was designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union due to a
survey made by the government; that he introduced more improvements on the
property by cultivating the land, and in March 2006, he put up a “bahay kubo”;
that in October 2006, he installed a fence made of “bolo” to secure the
property; that in installing the fence, he was guided by the concrete monuments
which he knew to be indicators of the boundaries of petitioner’s property; that
while he could not locate some of the monuments, he based the boundaries on his
recollection since he was around when these were installed; that he knew the
boundaries of petitioner’s property because he knew the extent of the “iron
mining” activities done by a company on the said property; that petitioner was
never in actual possession of the property occupied by him, and it was only on
October 31, 2006 when he discovered the alleged intrusion; that it was not
correct to say that he refused to vacate and surrender the premises despite
receipt of the demand letters because in his letter- reply, he assured
petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate the premises if he would only be
shown to have intruded into petitioner’s titled lot after the boundaries were
pointed out to him; and that instead of showing the boundaries to him,
petitioner filed an action for forcible entry before the MTC.
On April 26,
2011, the MTC ruled in favor or respondent. It stated that petitioner failed to
adduce any evidence to prove that the lot occupied by respondent was within his
lot titled under OCT No. RP-174(13789). It also explained that petitioner
failed to prove his prior physical possession of the subject property.
The RTC
reversed the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. It relied on the
cases of Barba v. Court of Appeals and Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc.,
which held that in ejectment cases, possession of the land did not only mean
actual or physical possession but also included the subject of the thing to the
action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established
for acquiring such right. The RTC stated that petitioner had clearly shown his
possession of the property as evidenced by his OCT No. RP-174(13789) issued in
March 1987 and tax declaration, dating back as early as 1995.
The CA
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Citing Quizon v. Juan, it
emphasized that petitioner must allege and prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the property in dispute. The word “possession,” as used in
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, meant nothing more than physical
possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. The CA
wrote that petitioner was not in physical possession despite the presentation
of the OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax declarations. It reiterated that when
the law would speak of possession in forcible entry cases, it is prior physical
possession or possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de jure.
What petitioner proved was legal possession, not his prior physical possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not petitioner has established prior possession over the subject property
RULING:
There is
only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or
material possession of the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not
possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not
involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession.
As a rule,
the word “possession” in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more
than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure
or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the
issue, and the absence of it “is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief
from the parties in an ejectment case.”
The Court, however,
has consistently ruled in a number of cases that while prior physical
possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth
of merit in respondent’s position is evident from the principle that possession
can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a
thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right.
Possession
can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the
force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession,
execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory
information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that
possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet
on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action
of his will. Here, respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these
circumstances. He could not even say that the subject property was leased to
him except that he promised that he would vacate it if petitioner would be able
to show the boundaries of the titled lot.
In the case
at bench, the Court finds that petitioner acquired possession of the subject
property by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free patent
under CA 141 and its subsequent registration with the ROD on March 18, 1987.
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