CASE DIGEST: Mangaser v. Ugay

 

ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, petitioner, vs. DIONISIO UGAY, respondent
G.R. No. 204926          |          December 3, 2014

FACTS:

On Oct. 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser filed a complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages against respondent Dionisio Ugay. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an area of 10,632 square meters and covered by OCT No. RP-174; that on October 31, 2006, petitioner, discovered that respondent stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his property by constructing a residential house thereon without his knowledge and consent; and that demand letters were sent to respondent but he still refused to vacate the premises, thus, he was constrained to seek judicial remedy.

Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and put up the following defenses: that he had been a resident of Samara, Aringay, La Union, since birth and when he reached the age of reason, he started occupying a parcel of land in that place then known as Sta. Lucia, Aringay, La Union; that years later, this parcel of land was designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union due to a survey made by the government; that he introduced more improvements on the property by cultivating the land, and in March 2006, he put up a “bahay kubo”; that in October 2006, he installed a fence made of “bolo” to secure the property; that in installing the fence, he was guided by the concrete monuments which he knew to be indicators of the boundaries of petitioner’s property; that while he could not locate some of the monuments, he based the boundaries on his recollection since he was around when these were installed; that he knew the boundaries of petitioner’s property because he knew the extent of the “iron mining” activities done by a company on the said property; that petitioner was never in actual possession of the property occupied by him, and it was only on October 31, 2006 when he discovered the alleged intrusion; that it was not correct to say that he refused to vacate and surrender the premises despite receipt of the demand letters because in his letter- reply, he assured petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate the premises if he would only be shown to have intruded into petitioner’s titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out to him; and that instead of showing the boundaries to him, petitioner filed an action for forcible entry before the MTC.

On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor or respondent. It stated that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove that the lot occupied by respondent was within his lot titled under OCT No. RP-174(13789). It also explained that petitioner failed to prove his prior physical possession of the subject property.

The RTC reversed the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. It relied on the cases of Barba v. Court of Appeals and Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., which held that in ejectment cases, possession of the land did not only mean actual or physical possession but also included the subject of the thing to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. The RTC stated that petitioner had clearly shown his possession of the property as evidenced by his OCT No. RP-174(13789) issued in March 1987 and tax declaration, dating back as early as 1995.

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Citing Quizon v. Juan, it emphasized that petitioner must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute. The word “possession,” as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, meant nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. The CA wrote that petitioner was not in physical possession despite the presentation of the OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax declarations. It reiterated that when the law would speak of possession in forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de jure. What petitioner proved was legal possession, not his prior physical possession.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has established prior possession over the subject property

RULING:

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.

As a rule, the word “possession” in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it “is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.”

The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases that while prior physical possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in respondent’s position is evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will. Here, respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these circumstances. He could not even say that the subject property was leased to him except that he promised that he would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot.

In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner acquired possession of the subject property by juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under CA 141 and its subsequent registration with the ROD on March 18, 1987.