CASE DIGEST: Bright Maritime Corporation v. Fantonial

 

BRIGHT MARITIME CORPORATION (BMC)/DESIREE P. TENORIO, petitioners, vs. RICARDO B. FANTONIAL, respondent
G.R. No. 165935                |              February 8, 2012

FACTS:

On January 15, 2000, a Contract of Employment was executed by petitioner BMC and respondent Ricardo B. Fantonial, in which respondent shall be employed as boatswain of M/V AUK for 1 year.

Respondent was made to undergo a medical examination at the Christian Medical Clinic, which was petitioner’s accredited medical clinic, and was declared “FIT TO WORK.”

After having undergone the pre-departure orientation seminar and equipped with the necessary requirements and documents for travel, respondent was instructed by petitioners that he would be departing on January 17, 2000 and that a liaison officer would deliver his plane ticket to him at NAIA. However, petitioners’ liaison officer met respondent at the airport and told him that he could not leave on that day due to some defects in his medical certificate. The liaison officer instructed respondent to return to the Christian Medical Clinic.

When respondent went back to Christian Medical Clinic the next day, he was told by the examining physician that there was nothing wrong or irregular with his medical certificate. Respondent went to petitioners’ office for an explanation, but he was merely told to wait for their call, as he was being lined-up for a flight to the ship’s next port of call. However, respondent never got a call from petitioners.

On May 16, 2000, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners.

Petitioner claims that respondent was not declared fit to work due to some medical problems. Petitioners submitted the Affidavit of Dr. Lyn dela Cruz-De Leon, stating that the said doctor examined respondent on January 17, 2000; that physical and laboratory results were all within normal limits except for the finding, after chest x-ray, of Borderline Heart Size, and that respondent was positive to Hepatitis B on screening; that respondent underwent ECG to check if he had any heart problem, and the result showed left axis deviation. Petitioners further argued that they cannot be held liable for illegal dismissal as the contract employment had not yet commenced.

Petitioners asserted that since respondent was not yet declared fit to work on January 17, 2000, he was not able to leave on the scheduled date of his flight to Germany to join the vessel. With his non-departure, the employment contract was not commenced; hence, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.

ISSUE:

Whether or not employer-employee relationship has already commenced between respondent and petitioner

RULING:

An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment (1) the parties come to agree upon its terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof: (a) consent of the contracting parties, (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and (c) cause of the obligation. The object of the contract was the rendition of service by respondent on board the vessel for which service he would be paid the salary agreed upon.

Hence, in this case, the employment contract was perfected on January 15, 2000 when it was signed by the parties. However, the employment contract did not commence since petitioners did not allow respondent to leave on January 17, 2000 to embark the vessel M/V AUK in Germany on the ground that he was not yet declared fit to work on the day of departure.

In Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., the Court held that the employment contract did not commence when the petitioner therein, a hired seaman, was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire; thus, no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties.

Nevertheless, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. If the reverse happened, that is, the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

Petitioners’ act of preventing respondent from leaving and complying with his contract of employment constitutes breach of contract for which petitioner BMC is liable for actual damages to respondent for the loss of one-year salary as provided in the contract.


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