C.F. SHARP & CO. INC.
and JOHN J. ROCHA, petitioners, vs. PIONEER INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION,
WILFREDO C. AGUSTIN and HERNANDO G. MINIMO, respondents
G.R. No. 179469 | February 15, 2012
FACTS:
Respondents Wilfredo C. Agustin and
Hernando G. Minimo applied with C.F. Sharp sometime in August 1990 as
sandblasters and painters in Libya. After passing the interview and submission
of the requirements, a Contract of Employment was executed between respondents
and C.F. Sharp. They were then advised to prepare for immediate deployment and
to report to C.F. Sharp to ascertain the schedule of their deployment.
However, after a month respondents have not
yet been deployed prompting them to request for the release of the documents
they had submitted to C.F. Sharp. C.F. Sharp allegedly refused to surrender the
documents which led to the filing of a complaint by respondents before the
POEA.
The POEA found C.F. Sharp guilty of
violation of Art. 34(k) of the Labpr Code. Consequently, C.F. Sharp’s license
was suspended until the return of the disputed documents to respondents.
On March 10, 1995, respondents filed a
Complaint for breach of contract and damages against C.F. Sharp and its surety,
Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation. Respondents claimed that C.F. Sharp
falsely assured them of deployment and that its refusal to release the disputed
documents on the ground that they were already bound by reason of the Contract
of Employment, denied respondents of employment opportunities abroad and a
guaranteed income.
The trial court ruled that there was a
violation of the contract when C.F. Sharp failed to deploy and release the
papers and documents of respondents, hence, they are entitled to damages.
On appeal, C.F. Sharp and Rocha raise a
jurisdictional issue—that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the instant case
pursuant to Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797 which vests upon the POEA
the jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, arising out of or by
virtue of any contract involving workers for overseas employment. C.F. Sharp
and Rocha refuted the findings of the trial court and maintained that the
perfection and effectivity of the Contract of Employment depend upon the actual
deployment of respondents.
The CA held that since there is no
perfected employment contract between the parties, it is the RTC and not the
POEA, whose jurisdiction pertains only to claims arising from contracts
involving Filipino seamen, which has jurisdiction over the instant case.
Despite the finding that no contract was perfected between the parties, the
Court of Appeals adjudged C.F. Sharp and Rocha liable for Damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is already a perfected
employment contract
RULING:
Under Article 1315 of the Civil Code, a
contract is perfected by mere consent and from that moment the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but
also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law.
An employment contract, like any other
contract, is perfected at the moment (1) the parties come to agree upon its
terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof: (a) consent of the
contracting parties, (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract and (c) cause of the obligation.
The commencement of an employer-employee
relationship must be treated separately from the perfection of an employment
contract.
Despite the fact that the employer-employee
relationship has not commenced due to the failure to deploy respondents in this
case, respondents are entitled to rights arising from the perfected Contract of
Employment, such as the right to demand performance by C.F. Sharp of its
obligation under the contract.
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