CASE DIGEST: Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Natividad

 


LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents
G.R. No. 127198                |              May 16, 2005

FACTS:

On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to PD 27.

The trial Court respondents and ordered DAR and LBP to pay the respondents the amount of P30.00/sq.m. as just compensation for the land acquired by the State.

DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court for being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice of hearing. Consequently, Land Bank failed to file a timely appeal and the said Decision became final and executory.

Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996, citing excusable negligence as its ground for relief. The affidavit of Land Bank’s counsel of record notably states that “he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing” due to his heavy workload.

The trial court denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence.

Land Bank insist that equity considerations demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration.

The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR’s valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents’ evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to try and hear cases of just compensation under AR

Whether or not the trial court committed GADALEJ in ruling for the amount for just compensation

RULING:

Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR’s valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.

The records reveal that Land Bank’s contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court.

In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, the SC declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DAR’s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.

Land Bank’s contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, MalacaƱang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.

Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of RA 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law.

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.

In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessor’s value and the volume and value of its produce.


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