CASE DIGEST: Monroy v. Court of Appeals

 

ROBERTO R. MONROY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE DEL ROSARIO, respondents

G.R. No. L-23258               |              July 1, 1967

FACTS:

Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal when he filed his certificate of candidacy as representative of the 1^st district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections on Sept. 15, 1961. Three days later, he withdrawn said certificate of candidacy.

But on Sept. 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del Rosario, then  vice mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.

The CFI of Rizal held that (a) the petitioner had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed on September 15, 1961; (b) respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such on September 21, 1961; (c) petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office; and (d) petitioner must pay respondent  1,000.00 as moral damages.

The judgment was affirmed in toto upon appeal to the CA except for the award of moral damages.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is still entitled to his office

Is compensation an element of a public office?

Does a de facto officer entitled to reimbursement?

RULING:

The withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.

The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.

The Rodriguez case is not applicable here for absence of factual and legal similarities. The Rodriguez case involved a senator who had been proclaimed as duly elected, assumed the office and was subsequently ousted as a result of an election contest. These peculiar facts called for the application of an established precedent in this jurisdiction that the candidate duly proclaimed must assume office notwithstanding a protest filed against him and can retain the compensation paid during his incumbency. But the case at bar does not involve a proclaimed elective official who will be ousted because of an election contest. The present case for injunction and quo warranto involves the forfeiture of the office of municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to that office by the vice-mayor because of the operation of Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code. The established precedent invoked in the Rodriguez case can not therefore be applied in this case.

It is the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title” that applies in the present case. The resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer who did actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The question of compensation involves different principles and concepts however. Here, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is decisive. A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.