JUANITA SALAS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
FILINVEST FINANCE & LEASING CORPORATION, respondentsG.R. No. 76788 | January 22, 1990
FACTS:
On February 6, 1980, Juanita Salas bought a motor vehicle
from the Violago Motor Sales Corporation for P58,138.20 as evidenced by a
promissory note. This note was subsequently endorsed to Filinvest Finance &
Leasing Corporation which financed the purchase.
Petitioner defaulted in her installments beginning May 21,
1980 allegedly due to a discrepancy in the engine and chassis numbers of the
vehicle delivered to her and those indicated in the sales invoice.
This failure to pay prompted private respondent to initiate
a civil case for sum of money against petitioner. The trial court ordered Salas
to pay Filinvest and dismissed her counterclaim.
Both petitioner and private respondent appealed to the Court
of Appeals. Imputing fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation against VMS for
having delivered a different vehicle to petitioner, the latter prayed for a
reversal of the trial court’s decision so that she may be absolved from the
obligation under the contract.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision and his
subsequent MTR was denied. Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner argues that in the light of the provision of the
law on sales by description which she alleges is applicable here, no contract
ever existed between her and VMS and therefore none had been assigned in favor
of private respondent. She contends that it is not necessary to implead VMS as
a party to the case before it can be made to answer for damages because VMS was
earlier sued by her for “breach of contract with damages” before the RTC of
Olongapo City. She cites as authority the decision therein where the court
originally ordered petitioner to pay the remaining balance of the motor vehicle
installments in the amount ofP31,644.30 representing the difference between the
agreed consideration of P49,000.00 as shown in the sales invoice and
petitioner’s initial downpayment of P17,855.70 allegedly evidenced by a
receipt.
Private respondent in its comment, prays for the dismissal
of the petition and counters that the issues raised and the allegations adduced
therein are a mere rehash of those presented and already passed upon in the
court below, and that the judgment in the “breach of contract” suit cannot be
invoked as an authority as the same is still pending determination in the
appellate court.
ISSUE:
whether the promissory note in question is a negotiable
instrument which will bar completely all the available defenses of the
petitioner against private respondent.
RULING:
The records reveal that involved herein is not a simple case
of assignment of credit as petitioner would have it appear, where the assignee
merely steps into the shoes of, is open to all defenses available against and
can enforce payment only to the same extent as, the assignor-vendor.
Among others, the instrument in order to be considered
negotiable must contain the so-called “words of negotiability—i.e., must be
payable to ‘order’ or ‘bearer.’ ” Under Section 8 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, there are only two ways by which an instrument may be made payable to
order. There must always be a specified person named in the instrument and the
bill or note is to be paid to the person designated in the instrument or to any
person to whom he has indorsed and delivered the same. Without the words “or
order” or “to the order of”, the instrument is payable only to the person
designated therein and is therefore non-negotiable. Any subsequent purchaser
thereof will not enjoy the advantages of being a holder of a negotiable
instrument, but wil merely “step into the shoes” of the person designated in
the instrument and will thus be open to all defenses available against the
latter.
In the case at bar, the basis of private respondent’s claim
against petitioner is a promissory note which bears all the earmarks of
negotiability.
A careful study of the questioned promissory note shows that
it is a negotiable instrument, having complied with the requisites under the
law as follows: [a] it is in writing and signed by the maker Juanita Salas; [b]
it contains an unconditional promise to pay the amount of P58,138.20; [c] it is
payable at a fixed or determinable future time which is “P1,614.95 monthly for
36 months due and payable on the 21st day of each month starting March 21, 1980
thru and inclusive of Feb. 21, 1983;” [d] it is payable to Violago Motor Sales
Corporation, or order and as such, [e] the drawee is named or indicated with
certainty.
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