CASE DIGEST: Maquiling v. Commission on Elections

 

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, respondents

G.R. No. 195649. April 16, 2013.

ACTION: Petition for disqualification and/or to cancel certificate of candidacy

GROUND(S): Respondent contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kausawagan, LDN and that he is a foreigner

FACTS:

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.

Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008. On the same day, an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as “USA-American.” To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented a computer-generated travel record1 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer.

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that “Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention,” whereas the First Division still could “not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code.”

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen. It ruled that Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office.

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that „the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law.” He raised the following contentions, among others: (1) that he used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it; (2) Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction; and that (3) the proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law, having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of Proclamation. However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration. In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

ISSUE(S):

whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case

whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office

whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case

RULING:

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, Arnado was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. In Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC, the SC ruled that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement “The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position.” The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.