PATRICIA HALAGUENA, MA. ANGELITA L. PULIDO, MA.
TERESITA P. SANTIAGO, MARIANNE V. KATINDIG, BERNADETTE A. CABALQUINTO, LORNA B.
TUGAS, MARY CHRISTINE A. VILLARETE, CYNTHIA A. STEHMEIER, ROSE ANNA G. VICTA,
NOEMI R. CRESENCIO, and other flight attendants of PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,
petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INCORPORATED, respondentG.R. No. 172013 | October 2, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners
were employed as female flight attendants of respondent Philippine Airlines
(PAL) on different dates prior to November 22, 1996. They are members of the Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), a labor
organization certified as the sole and exclusive certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the flight attendants, flight stewards
and pursers of respondent.
On July 11,
2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement. Section
144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, provides that:
“A. For the
Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996:
x x x x
3.
Compulsory Retirement
Subject to
the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement
shall be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males. x x x.”
Petitioners
and several female cabin crews manifested that the aforementioned CBA provision
on compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment
with their male counterparts.
On July 12,
2004, Robert D. Anduiza, President of FASAP submitted their 2004-2005 CBA
proposals and manifested their willingness to commence the collective bargaining
negotiations between the management and the association, at the soonest
possible time.
On July 29,
2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the RTC of Makati against respondent for the invalidity of
Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA.
On August
9, 2004, the RTC issued an Order upholding its jurisdiction over the present
case. It reasoned out that the allegations in the petition do not make out a
labor dispute arising from employer-employee relationship.
On
September 27, 2004, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent or any of its agents and representatives
from further implementing Sec. 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA pending the
resolution of the case.
Aggrieved,
respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
The CA
ruled that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
whether the
RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action challenging the legality or
constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained
in the CBA
RULING:
In the case
at bar, the allegations in the petition for declaratory relief plainly show
that petitioners’ cause of action is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of
the PAL-FASAP CBA.
From the
petitioners’ allegations and relief prayed for in its petition, it is clear that
the issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is unlawful
and unconstitutional. Here, the petitioners’ primary relief is the annulment of
Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against
them for being female flight attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Section
19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil action,
the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.
The said
issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires
the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power
to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of
trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co.
v. Isnani, the Court held that not every dispute between an employer and
employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in
the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction
of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited
to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their
collective bargaining agreement.
Not every
controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between
employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely
incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the employer-employee
relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action
ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution
and CEDAW.
Thus, where
the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor
Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but
by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the
regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations,
resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations
nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather
in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside
the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and
the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these
agencies disappears.
In Gonzales
v. Climax Mining Ltd., the court affirmed the jurisdiction of courts over
questions on constitutionality of contracts, as the same involves the exercise
of judicial power.
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