CASE DIGEST: Davao Light & Power Co. v. Court of Appeals

 

TOPIC: Preliminary Attachment

Davao Light & Power Co. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 93262

FACTS:

On May 2, 1989 Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. filed a verified complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Queensland Hotel, etc. and Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment.

On May 3, 1989 Judge Nartatez, to whose branch the case was assigned by raffle, issued an Order granting the ex parte application and fixing the attachment bond at P4,600,513.37.

On May 11, 1989 the attachment bond having been submitted by Davao Light, the writ of attachment issued.

On May 12, 1989, the summons and a copy of the complaint, as well as the writ of attachment and a copy of the attachment bond, were served on defendants Queensland and Adarna; and pursuant to the writ, the sheriff seized properties belonging to the latter.

On September 6, 1989, defendants Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11, 1989), the Trial Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of the defendants.

ISSUE:

whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED, and the order and writ of attachment issued by Hon. Milagros C. Nartatez, Presiding Judge of Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No. 19513-89 against Queensland Hotel or Motel or Queensland Tourist Inn and Teodorico Adarna are hereby REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents.

RATIO:

It is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding has been commenced and jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff has been vested in the court, but before the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (either by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the court's authority), nothing can be validly done by the plaintiff or the court. It is wrong to assume that the validity of acts done during this period should be dependant on, or held in suspension until, the actual obtention of jurisdiction over the defendant's person. The obtention by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is one thing; quite another is the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or over the subject-matter or nature of the action, or the res or object hereof.

A preliminary attachment may be defined, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered.  It is a remedy which is purely statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it.  Withal no principle, statutory or jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter."  The phase, "at the commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of the filing of the complaint — which is the date that marks "the commencement of the action;"  and the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced — by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees — the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant. And this indeed, has been the immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts: for the plaintiff or other proper party to incorporate the application for attachment in the complaint or other appropriate pleading (counter-claim, cross-claim, third-party claim) and for the Trial Court to issue the writ ex-parte at the commencement of the action if it finds the application otherwise sufficient in form and substance.