CASE DIGEST: Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co.

 

PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY v. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT CO., INC

G.R. No. 127371                April 25, 2002

FACTS:

Pursuant to the approved Cabinet Reform Policy for the power sector, respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co. (CEPALCO) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition entitled “„In Re: Petition for Implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector, docketed as ERB Case No. 89-430. The petition sought the discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power Corporation within CEPALCO’s franchise area.

After hearing, the ERB rendered a decision granting the petition.

NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ERB denied. Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On October 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the motion for reconsideration filed by NAPOCOR with the ERB was out of time and therefore, the assailed decision became final and executory and could no longer be subject of a petition for review.

On a petition for review on certiorari, the SC affirmed the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, thus rendering final the decision of the ERB.

To implement the decision in ERB Case No. 89-430, CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC), petitioner, and advised the latter of its desire to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken from NPC (NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred to CEPALCO. PSC refused CEPALCO’s request, citing its contract for power supply with NAPOCOR effective until July 26, 1996.

To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction against CEPALCO with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. They alleged that there exists no legal basis to cut-off PSC’s power supply with NAPOCOR and substitute the latter with CEPALCO since: (a) there is a subsisting contract between PSC and NAPOCOR; (b) the ERB decision is not binding on PSC since it was not impleaded as a party to the case; and (c) PSC is operating within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate, a franchise area of PIA, not CEPALCO, pursuant to Sec. 4 (1) of P.D. 538. Moreover, the execution of the ERB decision would cause PSC a 2% increase in its electrical bills.

On April 11, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of PSC.

ISSUE:

whether or not injunction could be filed against the final and executory judgment of the ERB.

RULING:

The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief.

Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that facts and circumstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated. To disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments.

Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that a review of its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court. Settled is the rule that where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co- equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Hence, the trial court, being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts with co- equal administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.