CASE DIGEST: Saunar v. Executive Secretary Ermita

 

CARLOS R. SAUNAR v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, GR No. 186502, 2017-12-13

 

Facts:

Saunar was a former Regional Director of NBI. Through the years, he rose from the ranks and eventually became the Chief of the Anti-Graft Division. During his time as chief of the said division, Saunar conducted an official investigation regarding the alleged corruption relative to the tobacco excise taxes and involving then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, former President Joseph E. Estrada, and former Senator Jinggoy Estrada. President Estrada's assailed involvement in the tobacco excise tax issue became one of the predicate crimes included in his indictment for plunder.

In Special Order No. 4003 dated 27 August 2004, Saunar was reassigned as regional director for Western Mindanao based in Zamboanga City. During his stint as such, he received a subpoena ad testificandum from the Sandiganbayan requiring him to testify in the plunder case against President Estrada.

After securing approval from his immediate supervisor, Saunar appeared before the Sandiganbayan on several hearing dates, the last being on 27 October 2004.

On 29 October 2004, then NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco issued Special Order No. 005033 informing Saunar that he was relieved from his duties as regional director for Western Mindanao and was ordered to report to the DDROS for further instructions. Pursuant thereto, he reported to Bautista on the first week of November 2004. Bautista informed Saunar that an investigation was being conducted over his testimony before the Sandiganbayan and that he should just wait for the developments in the investigation. In the meantime, Bautista did not assign him any duty and told him to be available at any time whenever he would be needed. He made himself accessible by staying in establishments near the NBI. In addition, he also attended court hearings whenever required.

On 6 October 2006, Saunar received an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission requiring him to answer the allegations against him in the PAGC Formal Charge dated 3 October 2006. The charge was based on a letter from Wycoco recommending an immediate appropriate action against Saunar for his failure to report for work since 24 March 2005, without approved leave of absence for 4 months.

On 23 October 2006, Saunar was reassigned as regional director of the Bicol Regional Office. On 29 January 2007, he received a copy of the OP decision dismissing him from service.

The OP found Saunar guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, and dismissed him from service. It pointed out that Saunar failed to report for work for more than a year which he himself admitted when he explained that he did not report for work because he had not been assigned any specific duty or responsibility. The OP highlighted that he was clearly instructed to report to the DDROS but he did not do so. It added that it would have been more prudent for Saunar to have reported for work even if no duty was specifically assigned to him, for the precise reason that he may at any time be tasked with responsibilities. The OP, however, absolved Saunar from allegedly keeping government property during the time he did not report for work, noting that he was able to account for all the items attributed to him.

The CA affirmed in toto the OP decision. The appellate court ruled that Saunar was not deprived of due process because he was informed of the charges against him and was given the opportunity to defend himself. It expounded that the absence of formal hearings in administrative proceedings is not anathema to due process. On the other hand, the CA agreed that Saunar was guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty as manifested by his being on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) for a long period of time. The appellate court disregarded Saunar's explanation that he stayed in establishments nearby and that he had attended court hearings from time to time. In addition, the CA found that Saunar violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 because public interest was prejudiced when he continued to receive his salary in spite of his unjustified absences.

Issues:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AS GUARANTEED IN THE CONSTITUTION

Ruling:

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution is similar with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution in that it guarantees that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. While the words used in our Constitution slightly differ from the American Constitution, the guarantee of due process is used in the same sense and has the same force and effect.

In American jurisprudence, the due process requirement entails the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Likewise, it was characterized with fluidity in that it negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.

The U.S. Supreme Court clarified that a lack of formal hearing in the administrative level does not violate procedural due process.

In our legal system, however, the opportunity for a hearing after the administrative level may not arise as the reception of evidence or the conduct of hearings are discretionary on the part of the appellate courts. In our jurisdiction, the constitutional guarantee of due process is also not limited to an exact definition. It is flexible in that it depends on the circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.

In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations, the Court eruditely expounded on the concept of due process in administrative proceedings, to wit: The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." This principle emanate from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.  Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it

In Gas Corporation of the Phils. v. Minister Inciong, the Court explained that there is no denial of due process when a party is afforded the right to cross-examine the witnesses but fails to exercise the same.

In Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court expounded that administrative due process does not necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings.

Thus, while the Court in Arboleda recognized that the lack of a formal hearing does not necessarily transgress the due process guarantee, it did not however regard the formal hearing as a mere superfluity. It continued that it is a procedural right that may be invoked by the party. It is true that in subsequent cases, the Court reiterated that a formal hearing is not obligatory in administrative proceedings because the due process requirement is satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to explain their respective sides through position papers or pleadings. Nonetheless, the idea that a formal hearing is not indispensable should not be hastily thrown around by administrative bodies. A closer perusal of past jurisprudence shows that the Court did not intend to trivialize the conduct of a formal hearing but merely afforded latitude to administrative bodies especially in cases where a party fails to invoke the right to hearing or is given the opportunity but opts not to avail of it. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay, the Court explained that administrative bodies are free from a strict application of technical rules of procedure and are given sufficient leeway. In the said case, however, nothing was said that the freedom included the setting aside of a hearing but merely to allow matters which would ordinarily be incompetent or inadmissible in the usual judicial proceedings. In fact, the seminal words of Ang Tibay manifest a desire for administrative bodies to exhaust all possible means to ensure that the decision rendered be based on the accurate appreciation of facts. The Court reminded that administrative bodies have the active duty to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. As such, it would be more in keeping with administrative due process that the conduct of a hearing be the general rule rather than the exception.

In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, the Court opined that in illegal dismissal cases, a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory when requested by the employee in writing, or substantial evidentiary disputes exists, or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.

In Joson v. Executive Secretary Torres, the Court ruled that the respondent was denied due process after he was deprived of the right to a formal investigation with the opportunity to face the witnesses against him.

Thus, administrative bodies should not simply brush aside the conduct of formal hearings and claim that due process was observed by merely relying on position papers and/or affidavits. Besides, the Court in Joson recognized the inherent limitations of relying on position papers alone as the veracity of its contents cannot be readily ascertained. Through the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, administrative bodies would be in a better position to ferret out the truth and in turn, render a more accurate decision. In any case, the PAGC violated Saunar's right to due process because it failed to observe fairness in handling the case against him. Its unfairness and unreasonableness is readily apparent with its disregard of its own rules of procedure.

Under the PAGC rules of procedure, it is crystal clear that the conduct of clarificatory hearings is discretionary. Nevertheless, in the event that it finds the necessity to conduct one, there are rules to be followed. One, the parties are to be notified of the clarificatory hearings. Two, the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present in the hearings without the right to examine witnesses. They, however, may ask questions and elicit answers from the opposing party coursed through the PAGC. To reiterate, due process is a malleable concept anchored on fairness and equity. The due process requirement before administrative bodies are not as strict compared to judicial tribunals in that it suffices that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, such "reasonable opportunity" should not be confined to the mere submission of position papers and/or affidavits and the parties must be given the opportunity to examine the witnesses against them. The right to a hearing is a right which may be invoked by the parties to thresh out substantial factual issues. It becomes even more imperative when the rules itself of the administrative body provides for one. While the absence of a formal hearing does not necessarily result in the deprivation of due process, it should be acceptable only when the party does not invoke the said right or waives the same. The Court finds that Saunar was not treated fairly in the proceedings before the PAGC. He was deprived of the opportunity to appear in all clarificatory hearings since he was not notified of the clarificatory hearing attended by an NBI official. Saunar was thus denied the chance to propound questions through the PAGC against the opposing parties, when the rules of the PAGC itself granted Saunar the right to be present during clarificatory hearings and the chance to ask questions against the opposing party.