[ G.R. No. 87584, June 16, 1992 ]GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. GLORIA E.
CHATTO AND LINA DELZA CHATTO, RESPONDENTS
FACTS:
In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto,
and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the
movie 'Mother Dear' at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco
Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were unable
to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly
ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony
collapsed.
As soon as they were able to get out to the street they
walked to the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one
(1) day.
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital.
Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and
plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11.
Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the
collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It
maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction
defect.
The trial court awarded Chatto actual or compensatory and
moral damages and attorney's fees.
Upon appeal in the CA, petitioner claimed that the lower
court erred in finding that 'the ceiling of the balcony collapsed due to some
structural construction or architectural defect,' and not due to an act of god
or force majeure.
In its decision, respondent Court found the appeal to be
without merit. It ruled that:
“The lower court did not also err in its finding that the
collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony was due to construction
defects and not to force majeure. It was the burden of defendant-appellant to
prove that its theater did not suffer from any structural defect when it was
built and that it has been well maintained when the incident occured. This is
its Special and Affirmative Defense and it is incumbent on defendant-appellant
to prove it. Considering the collapse of the ceiling of its theater's balcony
barely four (4) years after its construction, it behooved defendant-appellant
to conduct an exhaustive study of the reason for the tragic incident. On this
score, the effort of defendant-appellant borders criminal nonchalance.”
ISSUE:
WON the collapse of the balcony ceiling considered a force
majeure and thus absolves petitioners from any liability
RULING:
Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the
theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because
its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any
reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it
had the burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure.
It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not offer any
explanation does not imply force majeure. In Pons y CompaƱia vs. La CampaƱia
Maritima, the Court held:
"An examination of the Spanish and American authorities
concerning the meaning of force majeure shows that the jurisprudence of these
two countries practically agree upon the meaning of this phrase.
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law, defines it
as --
'Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by
any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning, tempest, perils of
the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person.'
Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia, defines fuerza mayor as follows:
'The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as,
for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy,
attack by robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque
provideri neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating circumstances.'
Bouvier defines the same as --
'Any accident due to natural causes, directly, exclusively
without human intervention, such as could not have been prevented by any kind
of oversight, pains, and care reasonably to have been expected.'
Cockburn, chief justice, in a well-considered English case,
said that where a captain --
'Uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced
captains ordinarily have recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required
of him; and if, under such circumstances, he is overpowered by storm or other
natural agency, he is within the rule which gives immunity from the effects of
such vis major.'
The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural
accidents, such as those caused by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public
enemy, etc."
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the
collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our mind, the real reason
why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not
actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court
impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had
not even passed the government's examination. Verily, the post-incident
investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What
is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent
Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence
offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4)
years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the
causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time
of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered
if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining
the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr.Ong, there was no
adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His
answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact
dates of said inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That the
structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City
Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do
not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as
regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it
was ever inspected at all.
It is settled that:
"The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement
impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe
for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no
other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means."
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:
"Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and
exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper
care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant."
That presumption or inference was not overcome by the
petitioner.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as
petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the collapse was due to force
majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence,
which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's
definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure, for one to be exempt
from any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should
not have been guilty of negligence.
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