CASE DIGEST: Safeguard Security Agency v. Tangco

 

G.R. No. 165732. December 14, 2006.

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners, vs. LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondents

 

FACTS:

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank’s cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

 Respondents filed with the RTC of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification.

Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard.

In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline’s death was not due to Pajarillo’s negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense.

On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally.

The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo’s claim that he merely acted in selfdefense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo’s bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.

The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard’s evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision.

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004. Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 11 of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil liability.

ISSUE:

whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents

RULING:

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.

It is important to determine the nature of respondents’ cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.

A reading of respondents’ complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo’s act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:

ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals, the Court held:

“x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill, the Court already held that:

“x x x Article 2176, where it refers to “fault or negligence,” covers not only acts "not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.”

The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.

Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case. It would have been entirely different if respondents’ cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents’ cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

On whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline:

Respondents’ evidence established that Evangeline’s purpose in going to the bank was to renew her time deposit. On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.

Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from the bank and saw her talking to a man thereat; that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the bank’s branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.

Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the bank manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she would leave him under the flyover which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.

That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in petitioners’ petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct; that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo; that the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.

Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo’s claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo’s apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of Pajarillo’s imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.

As to whether Safeguard should be held solidarily liable:

As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. Actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks, Weapons Training, Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan, Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions, it had also been established during Camero’s cross examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and regulations. Notwithstanding Camero’s clarification on his re-direct examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same, the records do not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.

The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the security guard’s performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of the employees

It had not been established that after Pajarillo’s training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.

Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline’s act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.

Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. SO ORDERED.