CASE DIGEST: Yonaha v. Court of Appeals

 

EVELYN YONAHA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF HECTOR CAÑETE, respondents

G.R. No. 112346. March 29, 1996.

 

TOPIC: Civil Liability Arising From Crime; Subsidiary Liability

DOCTRINE:

The subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires: (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits “while” in the discharge of such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes the employer and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law.

FACTS:

On April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45 A.M., in Basak, Lapulapu City, Philippines, Elmer Ouano, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw sporting Plate No. GCX-237 duly registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and owned by EK SEA Products, bumped and hit Hector Cañete, which caused the latter’s instantaneous death.

The accused was found guilty beyond reasonable ground of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. Taking into account the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty which the prosecuting fiscal readily accepted, the trial court sentenced the accused to suffer and undergo an imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim; P30,000.00 for actual damages incurred in connection with the burial and the nightly prayer of the deceased victim and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

On 27 April 1992, a writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary award. In his Return of Service, the MTCC Deputy City Sheriff stated that he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that the latter had manifested his inability to pay the money obligation.

Forthwith, private respondents presented a “motion for subsidiary execution” with neither a notice of hearing nor notice to petitioner. Acting on the motion, nevertheless, the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution. The sheriff went to petitioner’s residence to enforce the writ, and it was then, allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was informed of Ouano’s conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employer’s liability had yet to be established. Private respondents opposed the motion.

ISSUE:

WON notice and hearing is necessary before a writ of subsidiary execution may be issued against an employer

RULING:

The statutory basis for an employer’s subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employer’s liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.

The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in her “motion to stay and recall,” as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The employer must be given his full day in court.

To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires: (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits “while” in the discharge of such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes the employer 8 and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, finding the order, dated 29 May 1992, as well as the order of 24 August 1992 to have been improvidently issued, said orders are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner shall be given the right to a hearing on the motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution filed by private respondents, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings conformably with our foregoing opinion. No costs.