MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES LEONORA J. GOMEZ and GABRIEL V. GOMEZ, respondentsG.R. No. 160110. June 18, 2014
DOCTRINE:
Moral Damages; Moral damages are not meant to be punitive
but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person.—
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
has undergone, by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. In prayers for
moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule.
Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and
alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To be entitled to such an award, the
claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered damages and that the
injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and
2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate
result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the
factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.
FACTS:
On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck owned by respondent
Leonora J. Gomez and driven by Antenojenes Perez was hit by a Mayamy bus
registered under the name of petitioner Elvira Lim and driven by petitioner
Mariano C. Mendoza.
Owing to the incident, an Information for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was
filed against Mendoza. Mendoza, however, eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed
a separate complaint for damages against Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual
damages, compensation for lost income, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.
According to PO1 Rosales, investigating officer of the case,
at around 5:30 a.m., the Isuzu truck, coming from Katipunan Road and heading
towards E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, was travelling along the downward portion of
Boni Serrano Avenue when, upon reaching the corner of Riviera Street, fronting
St. Ignatius Village, its left front portion was hit by the Mayamy bus.
According to PO1 Rosales, the Mayamy bus, while traversing the opposite lane,
intruded on the lane occupied by the Isuzu truck.
As a result of the incident, Perez, as well as the helpers
on board the Isuzu truck sustained injuries necessitating medical treatment
amounting to P11,267.35, which amount was shouldered by respondents. Moreover,
the Isuzu truck sustained extensive damages on its cowl, chassis, lights and
steering wheel, amounting to P142,757.40.
Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived
them of a daily income of P1,000.00. Engaged in the business of buying plastic
scraps and delivering them to recycling plants, respondents claimed that the
Isuzu truck was vital in the furtherance of their business.
For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of
ownership of the bus in question. Respondents argued that although the
registered owner was Lim, the actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez,
who had the bus attached with Mayamy Transport under the so-called “kabit
system.” Respondents then impleaded both Lim and Enriquez.
After weighing the evidence, the RTC found Mendoza liable
for direct personal negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and it
also found Lim vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the same Code.
As regards Lim, the RTC relied on the Certificate of
Registration issued by the LTO in concluding that she is the registered owner
of the bus in question. Although actually owned by Enriquez, following the
established principle in transportation law, Lim, as the registered owner, is
the one who can be held liable.
Displeased, petitioners appealed to the CA. After evaluating
the damages awarded by the RTC, such were affirmed by the CA with the exception
of the award of unrealized income which the CA ordered deleted.
Unsatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioners filed an
appeal by certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to moral damages
RULING:
First resolve whether Mendoza was negligent in driving…
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was
negligent in driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact that,
at the time of the collision, the bus intruded on the lane intended for the
Isuzu truck. Having encroached on the opposite lane, Mendoza was clearly in
violation of traffic laws. Article 2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation. In the case at bar, Mendoza’s violation of traffic laws was
the proximate cause of the harm.
The evidence on record shows that before the collision, the
Isuzu truck was in its rightful lane, and was even at a stop, having been
flagged down by a security guard of St. Ignatius Village. The mishap occurred
when the Mayamy bus, travelling at a fast speed as shown by the impact of the
collision, and going in the opposite direction as that of the Isuzu truck,
encroached on the lane rightfully occupied by said Isuzu truck, and caused the
latter to spin, injuring Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada, and considerably
damaging the Isuzu truck.
Having settled the fact of Mendoza’s negligence, then,
the next question that confronts us is who may be held liable.
According to Manresa, liability for personal acts and
omissions is founded on that indisputable principle of justice recognized by
all legislations that when a person by his act or omission causes damage or
prejudice to another, a juridical relation is created by virtue of which the
injured person acquires a right to be indemnified and the person causing the
damage is charged with the corresponding duty of repairing the damage. The
reason for this is found in the obvious truth that man should subordinate his
acts to the precepts of prudence and if he fails to observe them and causes
damage to another, he must repair the damage. His negligence having caused the
damage, Mendoza is certainly liable to repair said damage.
Additionally, Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable
under the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under such
doctrine, a person who has not committed the act or omission which caused
damage or injury to another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the
latter either directly or subsidiarily under certain circumstances. In our
jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed negligence is embodied in Article
2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action under said
article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection
or supervision, or both, of his employee.
Who is deemed as Medoza’s employer?
In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, the Court held that
the registered owner is deemed the employer of the negligent driver, and is
thus vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the
Civil Code. Citing Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, the Court ruled that
insofar as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor
vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is
considered merely as an agent of such owner. Thus, whether there is an
employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is
irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law
holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death
caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.
Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the supervision over him after
the selection (culpa vigilando), or both. The presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure; consequently, it may be rebutted. Accordingly, the
general rule is that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in the selection and supervision of his employee he has exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he
is relieved of liability. However, with the enactment of the motor vehicle
registration law, the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code —
that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage —
are no longer available to the registered owner of the motor vehicle, because
the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.
As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable
with Mendoza.
What may be awarded?
Actual or Compensatory Damages. Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained. They simply make good or replace the loss caused by the
wrong.
Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and
quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is
not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably
been foreseen by the defendant. Article 2199 of the same Code, however, sets
the limitation that, except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved. As such, to warrant an award of actual or
compensatory damages, the claimant must prove that the damage sustained is the
natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and, moreover, the
claimant must adequately prove the amount of such damage.
In the case at bar, the RTC, basing on the receipts
submitted by respondents and which receipts petitioners had the opportunity to
examine, found that the total repairs on the Isuzu truck amounted to
P142,757.40, and that the full hospitalization and medical expenses of Perez,
Anla, Banca, and Repisada amounted to P11,267.35. As such, these are the
amounts that respondents are entitled to as actual and compensatory damages.
Although respondents alleged in their complaint that the
damage to their Isuzu truck caused them the loss of a daily income of
P1,000.00, such claim was not duly substantiated by any evidence on record, and
thus cannot be awarded in their favor.
May moral damages be awarded?
Moral Damages. Moral damages are awarded to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant’s
culpable action.
In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an
exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but
are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person.
To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he
has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the
cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the damages
must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The
claimant must thus establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal
tie with the acts of the defendant.
In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the
presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or
psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission
factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and
4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
A review of the complaint and the transcript of stenographic
notes yields the pronouncement that respondents neither alleged nor offered any
evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological
suffering incurred by them.
In Kierulf v. CA, we observed that this Court cannot remind
the bench and the bar often enough that in order that moral damages may be
awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish,
fright and the like. Citing Francisco v. GSIS, the Court held that there must
be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if
the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his social
humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded.
Moreover, respondents were not able to show that their claim
properly falls under Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Respondents
cannot rely on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code which allows moral damages in
quasi-delicts causing physical injuries because in physical injuries, moral
damages are recoverable only by the injured party, and in the case at bar,
herein respondents were not the ones who were actually injured.
Neither can respondents rely on Article 21 of the Civil Code
as the RTC erroneously did. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and
has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which
is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; (3) and it
is done with intent to injure. In the present case, it can hardly be said that
Mendoza’s negligent driving and violation of traffic laws are legal acts.
Moreover, it was not proven that Mendoza intended to injure Perez, et al. Thus,
Article 21 finds no application to the case at bar.
All in all, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in
granting moral damages to respondents.
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