YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ, complainant, vs. SERGIO V.
PASCUA, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires City,
Cavite, respondentA.M. No. P-11-2972. September 28, 2011.
FACTS:
A complaint for violation of BP 22 were instituted by Alicia
Panganiban against Juanito Corpuz before the MTCC. On June 16, 2009, the MTCC
approved the Compromise agreement executed between Panganiban and Juanito and
dismissed provisionally the criminal cases. On January 25, 2010, the MTCC
allegedly rendered a judgment based on the Compromise Agreement, but there was
no copy of said judgment in the records of this case. When Juanito failed to
comply with his obligations under the Compromise Agreement, Panganiban filed
Motions for Execution. On March 17, 2010, the MTCC acted favorably on
Panganiban’s Motions and issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Sheriff of
the MTCC of Trece Martires City.
On June 2, 2010, Yolanda, Juanito’s wife, and her daughter
were in her office at the Cavite Provincial Engineering Office of Trece
Martires City. At around three o’clock in the afternoon, Sheriff Pascua arrived
at Yolanda’s office and demanded that Yolanda surrender the Toyota Town Ace
Noah with Plate No. 471, which was registered in Yolanda’s name, threatening to
damage the said vehicle if Yolanda would refuse to do so. Sheriff Pascua tried
to forcibly open the vehicle. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and to avoid
further indignities, Yolanda surrendered the key to the vehicle to Sheriff
Pascua, but she did not sign any document which Sheriff Pascua asked her to
sign.
Offended, humiliated, and embarrassed, Yolanda was compelled
to file the present administrative complaint against Sheriff Pascua. In
addition to the aforementioned incident, Yolanda alleged in her complaint that
Sheriff Pascua kept possession of the vehicle and even used the same on several
occasions for his personal use. Yolanda also claimed that her vehicle was
illegally confiscated or levied upon by Sheriff Pascua because the Writ of
Execution, which Sheriff Pascua was implementing, was issued against Juanito,
Yolanda’s husband. Yolanda further pointed out that Sheriff Pascua has not yet
posted the notice of sale of personal property, as required by Rule 39, Section
15 of the Rules of Court.
In his Comment, Sheriff Pascua denied that he threatened and
used force in levying upon the vehicle in question, and avowed that he was the
one maligned when he served the Writ of Execution at Yolanda’s residence.
Sheriff Pascua averred that after the levy, he politely informed Yolanda that
he would temporarily keep the vehicle at his place as there was no safe parking
within the court premises. Sheriff Pascua believed that it was not safe to park
the vehicle within the City Hall premises because of his personal experience.
Sheriff Pascua already stated in the Sheriff’s Return that he was keeping
temporary custody of Yolanda’s vehicle. He asserted that he never used the
vehicle as he owns an owner-type jeep, which he uses for serving writs and
other court processes, as well as for his family’s needs. He likewise
contradicted Yolanda’s claim that no public auction has been scheduled. In
fact, Yolanda already received on July 9, 2010 the Notice to Parties of
Sheriff’s Public Auction Sale and Notice of Sale of Execution of Personal
Property. Lastly, Sheriff Pascua argued that he only took Yolanda’s vehicle
after verification LTO that it was registered in Yolanda’s name and the vehicle
is their conjugal property, which could be levied upon in satisfaction of a
Writ of Execution against Juanito.
Yolanda filed a Reply belying the averments in Sheriff
Pascua’s Comment. Yolanda insisted that Sheriff Pascua committed an error in
levying upon the vehicle solely registered in her name to satisfy a Writ of
Execution issued against her husband and an impropriety in parking the vehicle
at his home garage.
In his Rejoinder, Sheriff Pascua maintained that he acted in
accordance with law. It was not his duty as sheriff to show proof that the
personal property he was levying upon to execute the civil aspect of the
judgment was conjugal; rather, the burden fell upon Yolanda to prove that the
said property was paraphernal. Sheriff Pascua further reiterated that he never
used vehicle for his needs. Sheriff Pascua lastly averred that he had no intention
of delaying the public auction of the vehicle and was merely following the
proper procedure for the reasonable appraisal of the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy on Yolanda’s car was proper
RULING:
Despite the undisputed facts that the MTCC Judgment and Writ
of Execution were against Juanito only, and the Toyota Town Ace Noah was
registered in Yolanda’s name solely, Sheriff Pascua proceeded to levy upon the
vehicle, invoking the presumption that it was conjugal property.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only
to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An
execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not
have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the
judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man’s
goods shall not be sold for another man’s debts.
A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property
not belonging to the judgment debtor. The sheriff may be liable for enforcing
execution on property belonging to a third party. If he does so, the writ of
execution affords him no justification, for the action is not in obedience to
the mandate of the writ.
Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the presumption that the
vehicle is the conjugal property of Juanito and Yolanda.
Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that
“[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.” However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it
must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation
of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when
the property was acquired is material. There is no such proof in the records of
the present case.
Sheriff Pascua’s assertions of diligence do not exculpate
him from administrative liability. After inquiry from the LTO, he already
discovered that the vehicle was registered in Yolanda’s name only. This fact
should have already prompted Sheriff Pascua to gather more information, such as
when Juanito and Yolanda were married and when did Yolanda acquire the vehicle,
which, in turn, would have determined whether or not Sheriff Pascua could
already presume that the said vehicle is conjugal property.
Moreover, when Sheriff Pascua proceeded in levying upon
Yolanda’s vehicle, he digressed far from the procedure laid down in Section 9,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for the enforcement of judgments.
The levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor may be
had by the executing sheriff only if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or
part of the full amount stated in the writ of execution. If the judgment
obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check,
or other mode acceptable to the judgment obligee, the judgment obligor is given
the option to immediately choose which of his property or part thereof, not
otherwise exempt from execution, may be levied upon sufficient to satisfy the
judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option immediately, or
when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff
can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real
properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment. Therefore, the sheriff cannot and should not be the one to determine
which property to levy if the judgment obligor cannot immediately pay because
it is the judgment obligor who is given the option to choose which property or
part thereof may be levied upon to satisfy the judgment.
Comments
Post a Comment