CASE DIGEST: Bangayan vs. People of the Philippines

 

[G.R. No. 235610. September 16, 2020]

RODAN A. BANGAYAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

 

FACTS:

According to the prosecution's witnesses, on January 5, 2012, AAA's brother, BBB, upon arriving home from the farm, saw Bangayan laying on top of AAA. Bangayan and AAA were both naked from the waist down. BBB shouted at Bangayan and told him that he would report what he did to AAA but the latter allegedly threatened to kill him if he tries to tell anyone.

On April 24, 2012, AAA, accompanied by her aunt, CCC, reported the incident to the police. On the same date, Dr. Villar examined AAA.

When Dr. Villar testified, he confirmed that AAA admitted to him that she had sexual intercourse with Bangayan on several occasions even prior to January 5, 2012. He explained that the "opening" noted during his examination is not a normal occurrence. For a young patient like AAA, it should have been closed. He further testified that AAA was already 2 to 3 months pregnant when she was examined which could be compatible with the claim that she had sexual intercourse with Bangayan in January 2012.

On October 2, 2012, AAA gave birth to a baby boy.

During arraignment on September 4, 2014, the counsel of Bangayan manifested that AAA, who was then 14 years old, executed an Affidavit of Desistance stating that she has decided not to continue the case against Bangayan because they "are living together as husband and wife and was blessed with a healthy baby boy."

On May 4, 2015, their second child was born.

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. Bangayan had sexual intercourse with AAA who was born on December 14, 1999 and was 12 years, one (1) month, and 14 days old at the time of the incident. For the RTC, the moral ascendancy or influence of Bangayan over AAA is beyond question due to their age gap of 15 years, and the fact that he is her brother- in-law, he being the brother of the husband of her older sister. The RTC ruled that it will not matter if AAA consented to her defloration because as a rule, the submissiveness or consent of the child under the influence of an adult is not a defense in sexual abuse. The RTC also considered the Affidavit of Desistance AAA executed as hearsay evidence because she did not testify regarding its execution.

On appeal, Bangayan argued that he had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is in a relationship with AAA and that the act complained of was consensual. Bangayan maintained that their persisting relationship should be taken into account and be considered an absolutory cause. He averred that this is similar to Article 266-C of R.A. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, on the effect of pardon where the subsequent valid marriage of the offended party to the offender shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. While there is no valid marriage to speak of yet, they were clearly living together as husband and wife as evidenced by the birth of their second child. Bangayan asserted that it would be in the best interest of their growing family to acquit him and allow him to help with rearing their children.

The CA denied Bangayan’s appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether Bangayan may use as a defense the consent of AAA and his on-going relationship with her which had already produced two children to exonerate himself from the charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610

RULING:

The records of this case show that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of sexual abuse contemplated under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610.

Pursuant to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7610, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. The present case does not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated. Therefore, not all the elements of the crime were present to justify Bangayan's conviction.

In explicitly stating that children deemed to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse under Section 5 of R.A. 7610, refer to those who engage in sexual intercourse with a child "for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," it is apparent that the intendment of the law is to consider the condition and capacity of the child to give consent.

Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 qualifies that when the victim of the sexual abuse is under 12 years of age, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code. This means that, regardless of the presence of any of the circumstances enumerated and consent of victim under 12 years of age, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the law is noticeably silent with respect to situations where a child is between 12 years old and below 18 years of age and engages in sexual intercourse not for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Had it been the intention of the law to absolutely consider as sexual abuse and punish individuals who engage in sexual intercourse with "children" or those under 18 years of age, the qualifying circumstances enumerated would not have been included in Section 5 of R.A. 7610.

The Court explained that the concept of consent under contract law and sexual consent in criminal law, which determines the guilt of an individual engaging in a sexual relationship with one who is between 12 to 18 years of age, are different. While in general, under the civil law concept of consent, in relation to capacity to act, all individuals under 18 years of age have no capacity to act, the same concept cannot be applied to consent within the context of sexual predation. Under civil law, the concept of "capacity to act" or "the power to do acts with legal effects" limits the capacity to give a valid consent which generally refers to "the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the case which are to constitute the contract." To apply consent as a concept in civil law to criminal cases is to digress from the essence of sexual consent as contemplated by the Revised Penal Code and R.A. 7610. Capacity to act under civil law cannot be equated to capacity to give sexual consent for individuals between 12 years old and below 18 years of age. Sexual consent does not involve any obligation within the context of civil law and instead refers to a private act or sexual activity that may be covered by the Revised Penal Code and R.A. 7610.

Where the age of the child is close to the threshold age of 12 years old, as in the case of AAA who was only 12 years and one month old at the time of the incident, evidence must be strictly scrutinized to determine the presence of sexual consent. The emotional maturity and predisposition of a juvenile, whose age is close to the threshold age of 12, may significantly differ from a child aged between 15-18 who may be expected to be more mature and to act with consciousness of the consequences of sexual intercourse.

In this case, there are special circumstances that reveal the presence of consent of AAA. The sexual congress between Bangayan and AAA was not limited to just one incident. They were in a relationship even after the incident alleged in the Information and had even produced two (2) children. According to the Court, these are not acts of a child who is unable to discern good from evil and did not give consent to the sexual act.