G.R. No. 114350. January 16, 1997.JOSE T. OBOSA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
On Dec. 4, 1987, accused Obosa and 3 others were charged, by
separate amended Informations, with murder on 2 count with the RTC of Makati
for the ambush-slaying of the DILG Secretary and his driver.
Each information alleged that the killing was with the
attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating circumstances: treachery,
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime purposely sought,
disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of his rank and age (as
to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band. The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the
evidence of guilt was strong
At the time of the commission of the two offenses, the
accused Obosa was a virtual ‘escapee’ from the National Penitentiary at
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at the Sampaguita Detention Station,
where he was serving a prison term for robbery as a maximum security prisoner.
By virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon, accused Obosa was escorted out of
prison to appear before said judge on the pretext that the judge needed his
presence so that the judge could inquire about the whereabouts of the accused
therein. While accused Obosa was out of prison, he was able to participate in
the commission of the double murder now charged against him as principal for
the ambush-slaying of Secretary Ferrer and his driver.
In its decision dated May 25, 1990, the lower court found
the accused Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide on two counts. In
ruling that the crime committed was homicide, not murder as charged in the
informations, the lower court declared that there was no qualifying
circumstance attendant. In fact, however, the lower court itself found that the
accused shot the victims while the latter were inside the car, unwary of any
danger to their lives, for unknown to them, were the assassins lurking in the
dark, firing their guns from behind, a circumstance indubitably showing
treachery.
On May 31, 1990, the lower court promulgated its decision and
on the same occasion, accused Obosa manifested his intention to appeal and
asked the Court to allow him to post bail for his provisional liberty.
Immediately, the lower court granted accused Obosa’s motion.
On June 1, 1990, accused Obosa filed a written notice of
appeal thereby perfecting appeal from the decision and the lower court thereby
lost jurisdiction over the case.
The CA computed the penalties imposed upon the petitioner
for his previous offense and ruled that petitioner was not entitled to bail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction grant bail
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter
of right
RULING:
The Court found that the written notice of appeal, although dated
June 4, 1990, was made and actually served upon the trial court on June 1,
1990. Since petitioner did file the written notice of appeal on June 1, 1990,
petitioner’s appeal was, perforce, perfected, without need of any further or
other act, and consequently and ineluctably, the trial court lost jurisdiction
over the case, both over the record and over the subject of the case.
While bail was granted by the trial court when it had
jurisdiction, the approval of the bail bond was done without authority, because
by then, the appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had lost
jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have been different had bail
been granted and approval thereof given before the notice of appeal was filed.
As the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of
jurisdiction, then the bailbond was never validly approved.
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.”
In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage, the Court explained
the purpose of bail and why it should be denied to one charged with a capital
offense when evidence of guilt is strong:
“x x x Before conviction, every person is bailable except if
charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a
right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach.
It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with
a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself
scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a
guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of
Cooley, a ‘mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty,
insure the attendance of the accused’ for the subsequent trial. Nor is there
anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense
when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the
outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present
threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.”
The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an appellant
who, though convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital
offense. Such appellant can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the
ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction
(and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not
insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead
being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged.
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