PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 147703 | April 14, 2004
FACTS:
On July 27, 1994, Napoleon Roman y Macadandang was found
guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to property was sentenced to 4 yrs, 9
mos, and 11 days to 6 years imprisonment and to pay damages.
The court further ruled that, in the event of the insolvency
of accused, the herein petitioner, Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., shall be
liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment
against accused had become final and executory.
However, the accused had jumped bail and remained at-large.
Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by petitioner, filed a
notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. Simultaneously,
petitioner filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court.
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied
the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once
determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s
subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer
to dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against
the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment.
Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by
the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became
final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the
employer’s subsidiary liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in
the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused.
RULING:
The 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what
civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
“When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
“x x x x x x x x x”
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence,
the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of
conviction meted out to the employee.
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of
reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately
from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2167 of the Civil Code shall remain “separate, distinct and independent”
of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
1.
The right to bring the foregoing actions based
on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they
are not deemed included therein.
2.
The institution or the waiver of the right to
file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish
the right to bring such action.
3.
The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover more than once for the same act or omission.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is
the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex
delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or
quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended
party may—subject to the control of the prosecutor—still intervene in the
criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein. This
is in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that “every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”
Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the
criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee. The
cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare
that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an
interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
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