JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G.
VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ, SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ,
HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G. MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R. NEREUS
O. ACOSTA, respondents.G.R. No. 188920. February 16, 2010.
ISSUE:
Does COMELEC possess jurisdiction over intra-party disputes?
FACTS:
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon, as erstwhile
president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his party’s withdrawal of
support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But
petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr., LP Chairman, and a number of party members
denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the announcement without
consulting his party.
On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party
conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when
convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LP’s ruling
body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president.
Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC
to nullify the elections. On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution,
partially granting respondent Drilon’s petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006
elections and ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision.
Both sides of the dispute came to the SC to challenge the
COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution,
granting respondent Drilon’s petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza.
The Court held, through majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the
intra-party leadership dispute.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party
leaders before respondent Drilon’s term expired. Eventually, that meeting
installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.
On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor,
Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion
Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto,
filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction6 before the COMELEC
against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party
secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the
presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was
invalidly convened. Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza,
the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some
members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the status of “guests” during the
meeting.
On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that
Roxas’ election as LP president faithfully complied with the provisions of the
amended LP Constitution. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party
deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for
holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006.
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution
denying petitioners Atienza, et al.’s petition. It noted that the May 2007
elections necessarily changed the composition of the NECO since the amended LP
Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the House of
Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body. Petitioners failed
to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president was not properly
convened.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.’s
expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue
that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC
treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to
resolve.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
resolution, petitioners Atienza, et al. filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC
selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of the
NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their expulsion from the party.
The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership controversy involved
in the case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically
upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership disputes.
RULING:
But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue
in this case is not the validity of the expulsion of petitioners Atienza, et
al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly that elected
respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELEC’s finding as upheld by the
Court that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution,
the resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled
petitioners cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO held.
While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of
LP members belong to their faction, they did not specify who these members were
and how their numbers could possibly affect the composition of the NECO and the
outcome of its election of party leaders. Atienza, et al. has not bothered to
assail the individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for Roxas.
Nor did Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then
assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et al. were totally
unsupported by evidence.
Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that
their expulsion from the party impacts on the party leadership issue or on the
election of respondent Roxas as president so that it was indispensable for the
COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the validity or
invalidity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion was purely a membership issue that
had to be settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is
limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all
controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free
to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC
may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the
discharge of its constitutional functions.
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership
disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section
2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, “include the ascertainment of the identity
of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts.”
The Court also declared in another case that the COMELEC’s power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who
must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership
dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to
register political parties.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from
the party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves
a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of law.
According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the
equivalent of administrative proceedings and are, therefore, covered by the due
process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.
But the requirements of administrative due process do not
apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due process standards
set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state and
through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed.
The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of
life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a
limitation on the state’s powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The
right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary
government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or
entities. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by
the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in
private controversies involving private parties.
Although political parties play an important role in our
democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is
still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members
by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property
within the meaning of the due process clause.
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts
will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a
political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs,
pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca
v. Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters
serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate
without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of
allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice
of the people.
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