DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, respondents.G.R. No. 193237. October 9, 2012.
ACTION(S):
Petition to deny due course and to cancel COC
GROUNDS: material
misrepresentation; Jalosjos declared under oath that he was eligible for the
Office of the Mayor when he had already been convicted by final judgment for
robbery
FACTS:
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was
running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a
false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared
under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his
certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment
for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the RTC of Cebu City. Cardino
asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his
conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino
countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation. Jalosjos refuted Cardino
and stated that the RTC issued an Order declaring that Jalosjos had duly
complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the
2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against
him on the same grounds.
On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s
petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First
Division concluded that Jalosjos has indeed committed material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared, under oath,
that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is
not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he
has not yet served. The COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos’ certificate
of compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet
served his sentence. The COMELEC First Division ruled that Jalosjos is not
eligible by reason of his disqualification as provided for in Section 40(a) of
Republic Act No. 7160.
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos’
probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as
candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and (3) cancelled
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos committed
a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in
good faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same
position from which he is now being ousted.
RULING:
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos
arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material fact
involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from
the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time,
and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Mayor.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a
candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false material
representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his
certificate of candidacy “that he is eligible for said office.” A candidate is
eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not
actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case
from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the
candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a
petition under Section 78.
A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground
for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving
the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it,
by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of
the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect
of deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
office or to be elected to such office. The duration of the temporary absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other
hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special
disqualification means that the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually.
Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification
constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering
from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes, the Court instructs that the accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification “deprives the convict of the
right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually.”
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The
effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the
principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not.
The last sentence of Article 32 states that “the offender shall not be
permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual
special] disqualification.” Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it
is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at
the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and
the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office
perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold,
or to run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of
conviction became final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory
penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to
run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him
to state under oath. As used in Section 74, the word “eligible” means having
the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As the
Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false material
representation may refer to “qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers
from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office.
If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a
certificate of candidacy stating under oath that “he is eligible to run for
(public) office,” as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes
a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section
78.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that
existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never
give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start
to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or
after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means
he was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he
filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There
was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections―Cardino―who
received the highest number of votes.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer
cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared
ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of
the first- placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be
cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment
that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself
bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is
part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is
addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government
agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
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