CASE DIGEST: Peroxide Philippines Corporation v. Court of Appeals

 

TOPIC: Discharge of attachment and the counter-bond

PEROXIDE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. CA

GR No.92813, Jul 31, 1991

FACTS:

On December 6, 1982, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) sued Peroxide Philippines Corporation, Eastman Chemical Industries, Inc., and the spouses Edmund O. Mapua and Rose U. Mapua for the collection of an indebtedness of Peroxide wherein Eastman and the Mapuas bound themselves to be solidarily liable.

Upon the filing of said action, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was actually done on January 7, 1983 after BPI filed an attachment bond.

On January 11, 1983, Eastman and the Mapuas moved to lift the attachment. BPI also filed a written opposition to the motion to lift the writ of attachment and a motion to set for hearing the said motion to lift attachment and its opposition thereto.

Judge Pineda issued two (2) orders, the first, denying BPI's motion for a hearing, and, the second, lifting the writ of attachment as prayed for by Eastman and the Mapuas.  BPI filed a motion for reconsideration but, consequent to the then judiciary reorganization, the case was re-raffled and assigned to the sala of Judge Pastor Reyes.

On November 28, 1983, Judge Reyes issued an order with an explicit finding that the attachment against the properties of Eastman and the Mapuas was proper on the ground that they had disposed of their properties in fraud of BPI.

After more than 1 year, BPI moved for partial reconsideration, he trial court, this time with Judge Eficio B. Acosta presiding, issued an order reaffirming the writ of preliminary attachment and said writ may be executed and implemented immediately.

Petitioners sought the annulment thereof in a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court, wherein a temporary restraining order was issued.  This restraining order was lifted when said court rendered its decision in said case on March 14, 1986 dismissing the petition.

Petitioners then sought the review of said decision in G.R. No. 74558, but no temporary restraining order was granted therein.  In the meantime, on May 29, 1986, Judge Acosta issued an order suspending the writ of preliminary attachment in the aforesaid Civil Case pursuant to an ex parte motion filed by herein petitioners. 

Thereafter, in its resolution dated October 27, 1986, this Court denied the aforesaid petition for review on certiorari "considering that the writ of preliminary attachment issued was in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence."

ISSUE:

validity of the writ or whether or not the same was validly lifted and suspended by the lower court's orders dated January 17, 1983 and May 29, 1986, respectively.

RULING:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition at bar is DENIED and the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

It is undeniable that when the attachment is challenged for having been illegally or improperly issued, there must be a hearing with the burden of proof to sustain the writ being on the attaching creditor. That hearingembraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing parties and meet them.  The right to submit arguments implies that opportunity, otherwise the right would be a barren one.  It means a fair and open hearing.  And, as provided by Section 13 of Rule 57, the attaching creditor should be allowed to oppose the application for the discharge of the attachment by counter-affidavit or other evidence, in addition to that on which the attachment was made.

Respondent court was, therefore, correct in holding that, on the above-stated premises, the attachment of the properties of Eastman and the Mapuas remained valid from its issuance since the judgment had not been satisfied, nor has the writ been validly discharged either by the filing of a counterbond or for improper or irregular issuance.

The order of Judge Acosta, dated May 29, 1986, suspending the writ of attachment was in essence a lifting of said writ which order, having likewise been issued ex parte and without notice and hearing in disregard of Section 13 of Rule 57, could not have resulted in the discharge of the attachment.  Said attachment continued unaffected by the so-called order of suspension and could not have been deemed inefficacious.  Under the facts of this case, the ex parte discharge or suspension of the attachment is a disservice to the orderly. administration of justice and nullifies the underlying role and purpose of preliminary attachment in preserving the rights of the parties pendente lite as an ancillary remedy.