[ GR No. 119771, Apr 24, 1998 ]SAN ILDEFONSO LINES v. CA
FACTS:
At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota
Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of
herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. figured in a vehicular mishap at
the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig,
Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her 2
passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein
petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with multiple physical injuries.
About 4 months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private
respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the
van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured
under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages.
With the issues having been joined upon the filing of the
petitioners' answer to the complaint for damages and after submission by the
parties of their respective pre-trial briefs, petitioners filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings grounded on the pendency of the
criminal case against petitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC and the failure of
respondent PISC to make a reservation to file a separate damage suit in said
criminal action. This was denied by the Manila Regional Trial Court.
The CA upheld the assailed order of the Manila RTC.
ISSUES:
1.
If a criminal case was filed, can an independent
civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be
filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2.
Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an
independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no
reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the
criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively
participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?
RULING:
Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court reads:
“Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. -- In
the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be
brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal
action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."
There is no dispute that these so-called "independent
civil actions" based on the aforementioned Civil Code articles are the
exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action over the civil action as set
forth in Section 2 of Rule 111. However, it is easily deducible from the
present wording of Section 3 as brought about by the 1988 amendments to the
Rules on Criminal Procedure -- particularly the phrase "… which has been
reserved" -- that the "independent" character of these civil
actions does not do away with the reservation requirement. In other words,
prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent
civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination
apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action. That this should now be
the controlling procedural rule is confirmed by no less than retired Justice
Jose Y. Feria, remedial law expert and a member of the committee which drafted
the 1988 amendments, whose learned explanation on the matter was aptly pointed
out by petitioners, to wit:
"The 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil
action which is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless
waived, reserved or previously instituted xxx.
Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action
includes not only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but
also damages under Article 2176 of the said code. xxx
Objections were raised to the inclusion in this Rule of
quasi-delicts under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. However,
in view of Article 2177 of the said code which provides that the offended party
may not recover twice for the same act or omission of the accused, and in line
with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits, these objections were
overruled. In any event, the offended party is not precluded from filing a
civil action to recover damages arising from quasi-delict before the institution
of the criminal action, or from reserving his right to file such a separate
civil action, just as he is not precluded from filing a civil action for
damages under Articles 32, 33 and 34 before the institution of the criminal
action, or from reserving his right to file such a separate civil action. It is
only in those cases where the offended party has not previously filed a civil
action or has not reserved his right to file a separate civil action that his
civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
It should be noted that while it was ruled in Abella vs.
Marave that a reservation of the right to file an independent civil action is
not necessary, such a reservation is necessary under the amended rule. Without
such reservation, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless previously waived or instituted.
Sharing the same view on the indispensability of a prior
reservation is Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, whose analysis of the
historical changes in Rule 111 since the 1964 Rules of Court is equally
illuminating. Thus,
"1. Under Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the
civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless such civil action was expressly waived or reserved.
The offended party was authorized to bring an independent civil action in the
cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code
provided such right was reserved.
In the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same Rule 111
thereof reiterated said provision on the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. The independent civil actions, however, were limited to the
cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, obviously
because the actions contemplated in Articles 31 and 2177 of said Code are not
liabilities ex delicto. Furthermore, no reservation was required in order the
civil actions in said Articles 32, 33 and 34 may be pursued separately.
2. The present amendments introduced by the Supreme Court
have the following notable features on this particular procedural aspect, viz:
a. The civil
action which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, barring a
waiver, reservation or prior institution thereof, need not arise from the
offense charged, as the phrase 'arising from the offense charged' which creates
that nexus has been specifically eliminated.
b. The
independent civil actions contemplated in the present Rule 111 include the
quasi-delicts provided for in Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, in addition to the
cases provided in Arts. 32, 33 and 34 thereof. It is necessary, however, that
the civil liability under all the said articles arise 'from the same act or
omission of the accused.' Furthermore, a reservation of the right to institute
these separate civil actions is again required, otherwise, said civil actions
are impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the former are waived
or filed ahead of the criminal action."
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